Operation Bagration: The greatest military defeat of all time?

Voiceover: “In the summer of 1944, Germany suffered perhaps the greatest military defeat of all time. But it did not come on the beaches of Normandy where the combined Western Allies faced less than 25% of the German army. It came on the Eastern Front where the Soviet Union faced 75% of the German army on its own.

This was Operation Bagration. An operation that, in the space of just three weeks, annihilated an entire German Army Group and captured hundreds of kilometres of territory. An operation on such a vast scale that it challenges the limits of human understanding. If there is one battle from the Second World War that everyone should understand, its Operation Bagration – The Soviet Union’s greatest military victory.

By the spring of 1944, the reversal of fortunes on the Eastern Front had already occurred – Nazi Germany was in trouble. The overall size of the Soviet army had peaked in 1943 and essentially remained the same. But falling German manpower meant that the Soviets had an overall advantage of around 2 to 1 across the front as a whole. Worse for the Germans, while the Soviet forces may have peaked in quantity, they were still growing in quality.”

Helen Upcraft, IWM Curator: “Throughout the 1920s and 30s Soviet Officers concluded that the way to defeat the enemy lay in the application of successive blows from different directions, throughout the depth of the enemy formation. This idea was the heart of what became known as ‘Deep Battle’ doctrine. It focused on making small tactical breakthroughs that would allow mobile reserve units to rush into the enemy rear and destroy their ability to fight.

This may sound similar to German Blitzkrieg tactics, but in reality, they were very different. Where Blitzkrieg focussed on a single breakthrough at the tactical level, Deep Battle would make multiple breakthroughs at an operational level. The Soviets aimed to shift the point of attack, keeping the enemy guessing, to collapse their defensive system as a whole. But pulling off these tactics in the real world proved challenging.”

Voiceover: “Though the Soviets had won back vast swathes of territory throughout 1943 and early 1944 , they were yet to utilise Deep Battle to its truest potential. Whether it was meddling from Stalin, poor co-ordination of armoured forces, or logistical problems, the battered German forces had, so far, survived intact. The Soviets had higher aims – the wholesale destruction of the German army. As they prepared for their summer offensive of 1944, they were determined to get it right.

The target was the so called ‘Belorussian Balcony’, a huge salient in the German line. Stalin himself named the offensive after Prince Pyotr Bagration, a fellow Georgian who had died fighting Napoleon at Borodino in 1812. But unlike previous offensives he gave far more autonomy to his commanders planning the operation. They conceived a succession of attacks by four fronts that would encircle and destroy the German forces and open the way to the pre-war Soviet border.

In the firing line was Germany’s Army Group Centre. Since reaching the gates of Moscow in 1941, they had mostly been on the defensive. In particular, holding back the massive Soviet offensive at Rzhev in 1942 which cost the Soviets over 1m casualties. These were experienced units, but they were not expecting to be very busy that summer. Instead, German intelligence believed that the Soviets would continue their attacks in the south against Walter Model’s Army Group North Ukraine.”

Helen Upcraft: “The Soviets were desperate to convince the Germans that the offensive would continue in the south. They began a 'Maskirovka' or 'camouflage' campaign to disguise their buildup against Army Group Centre. Civilian populations were evacuated away from the front lines to minimise the possibility of Soviet deployments being leaked to the Germans. Soviet Staff Officers flew over positions making sure that the camouflage was utilised and effective. And strict radio silence rules were enforced whilst troops rotated to the rear to practice manoeuvres.

The campaign was successful. The Germans focussed all their efforts on the South, including a redeployment of most of their armoured forces to Army Group North Ukraine. Importantly, the Germans were not wrong, a large Soviet attack was being planned in Ukraine. But the Germans had the timing mixed up. As a result, Army Group Centre lost 15% of its divisions, 88% of its tanks, and 33% of its heavy artillery.”

Voiceover: “By the eve of Operation Bagration, the Soviets had mustered an advantage of nearly 4 to 1 in men, nearly 10 to 1 in artillery and 8 to 1 in tanks and self-propelled guns. But Army Group Centre had even bigger problems. If Stalin was ceding more control to his officers to run the Soviet campaigns, Hitler was doing the opposite.

Germany was already in an extremely difficult strategic position. With the Western Allies expected to land in France that summer, Hitler wanted to hold on to as much eastern territory as possible, until the landings in the west had been thrown back into the sea. As such the understrength and unprepared Army Group Centre was forbidden to retreat.

By early June, as the Soviet build up became more obvious, some commanders in Army Group Centre sought permission to move towards a less rigid defence. But their commander Ernst Busch refused, remaining loyal to Hitler. On the eve battle Hans Jordan of the 9th Army wrote these prophetic words in his war diary:

‘It would be possible to stop the enemy offensive, but not under the present directives which require an absolutely rigid defence. . . if a Soviet offensive breaks out the army will either have to go over to a mobile defence or see its front smashed’.

The opening salvos of Operation Bagration came not from the Red Army, but partisans behind the German lines.”

Helen Upcraft: “The role of Partisans in Operation Bagration cannot be downplayed. There were approximately 140,000 Partisans in the area who controlled entire districts. On the night of the 19th of June, Soviet Partisans detonated 10,000 demolition charges planted along German controlled railroad junctions, bridges and other strategic transportation points in the German rear. This severely hampered the German ability to move reinforcements and supplies to the threatened sections of the front, but it also forced the Germans to retreat through narrow corridors along roads and railways that were controlled by Partisans where they could be blocked and ultimately destroyed by the advancing Red Army.”

Voiceover: “Operation Bagration began on 22nd of June, 3 years to the day since the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The first moves came on the North towards Vitebsk, with probing attacks to test German defences and gain better staging areas for the main attack. But they made such strong inroads that 1st Baltic Front abandoned their attack plan for the following day to exploit those gaps instead. That same night Soviet bombers flew in to soften up the German defences.

Then on the 23rd of June, the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts began their attacks towards Orsha and Mogilev. And this was followed on the 24th by the 1st Belorussian front attacking towards Bobruisk.

The Soviets achieved huge concentrations in the breakthrough sectors, their 4 to 1 overall advantage becoming as high at 10 to 1 at some places. This overwhelming mass of infantry was accompanied by supporting fires from Soviet aircraft, which had near total control of the skies, and artillery and rocket fires.”

Helen Upcraft: “Their attacks began with huge artillery barrages, utilising weapons like this 122mm M30 howitzer. Sturdy and reliable, guns like these were still in use will into the 1970s. The Soviet barrages targeted both front and rear positions simultaneously in a “rolling double-barrage.” By German accounts, the bombardment was more intense and destructive than any seen previously during the war. 

But alongside the raw firepower, the Soviets showed real elegance in their operations. The attacks were controlled, using concentrated infantry and artillery to breach the German front in narrow sections. They kept their T-34 tanks hidden until the ground troops had created an opening, they then pushed through without worrying about their flanks.”

Voiceover: “At Vitebsk the Soviets made strong progress, the German 53rd Corps asked for permission to withdraw but by the time Hitler acquiesced it was too late. The city was encircled by the end of the 24th of June. Their attempts to breakout over the following days would come to nothing.

Things were more successful for the Germans at Orsha where the 78th Sturm Division of 27th Corps held back the initial attack. This could have posed a problem for the Soviets, as the 5th Guards Tank Army had originally intended to exploit the breakthrough there. However, the force simply moved north to exploit the breakthrough at Vitebsk instead. A clear example of the operational flexibility the Red Army was now capable of.

In the south, Soviet forces attempted to encircle Bobruisk across the Privet Marshes. These wetlands were believed to be impassable to heavy vehicles, but the Soviets built their own roads and manged to exploit their breakthroughs and drive into the enemy rear. On the 27th of June the Soviets encircled Bobruisk, trapping another two German corps. Once again, while they attempted to breakout, the German forces faced annihilation.”

Helen Upcraft:” In the face of the overwhelming Soviet forces the German commanders wanted to fall back. But Hitler was insistent that they hold their ground. He had designated strategic towns and cities as ‘feste platze’ or strongholds. These were to be defended to the last man. 

But the Germans had suffered too many losses at the start of Operation Bagration, they didn’t have the troops or supplies of equipment to adequately defend these locations. Furthermore, their remaining fortified places were of no strategic importance to the Soviets, who often bypassed them completely. Whilst this meant the Germans were spared the fight, they were now entirely cut off and couldn’t be involved in future operations.”

Voiceover: “By the 28th of June, Army Group Centre was in a disastrous position. The Soviets had torn massive gaps in their line and two armoured pincers now threatened to swing round their flanks and encircle them near Minsk. In response, Hitler sacked Busch and replaced him with Walter Model, his so called ‘fireman’ of the Eastern Front. But thanks to Allied advances in Normandy, Italy and the expected attack in the south there were few reinforcements available.

The reinforcements that did arrive were focussed on the main road to Minsk at the city of Borisov. Model wanted to hold the Soviets at the Berezina River to buy time for his units withdraw. But in heavy fighting they were forced out of the Borisov after being outflanked to the North. The Soviets crossed river after river throughout Belorussia, taking huge casualties, each one was a Normandy landing in and of itself.

On the 1st and 2nd of July a huge tank battle broke out to the northwest of Minsk between the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Panzer Division, who were desperate to hold the line. The Germans destroyed scores of Soviet tanks, but their own forces were severely depleted in the process. While these strong delaying actions may have stopped the Soviets in the past, the Red Army was now a different beast.”

Helen Upcraft: “Having achieved their breakthroughs, it was the turn of the Soviet mobile units to race through the gaps. The upgraded version of the T-34 had sloped frontal armour and could easily withstand hits from the 50mm guns, which most German anti-tank units were equipped with.

The Soviets also benefitted from the United States Lend Lease Act. The Act was introduced in 1941 with the aim of supplying US Allies with food, oil and equipment, but one of the most valuable deliveries were the American trucks. By the war’s end over 420,000 had been delivered to the Soviet Union. These trucks allowed the Soviets to mechanise their forces and supply their units deep into German rear areas. So, while the German forces were static, the Soviets were able to move at will.”

Voiceover: “The situation was now so desperate that Hitler made the rare decision to allow a Fester Platz to evacuate and Minsk was captured by the Soviets on the 3rd of July. Though some German forces managed to escape, once again it was too late. Most of 4th Army never even made it to Minsk, and around 100,000 men were now trapped in another huge pocket.

Over the following weeks these men would attempt to break out to the west, but shortages of ammunition and food quickly forced them to break down into smaller units where they became easy prey from Partisans combing the forests. In just a few weeks the Soviet advance had been staggering and Army Group Centre had effectively ceased to exist.”

Helen Upcraft: “On the 17th of July 1944, the Soviets marched over 50,000 German POWs through the main streets of Moscow to mark their victory in Belorussia. As a symbolic gesture the streets were washed down afterwards. Most of the prisoners had been captured near Minsk and would spend the rest of the war in Soviet labour camps. Conditions were harsh, lack of adequate food, shelter and clothing combined with forced labour led to a significant number of German POWs losing their lives. Official figures for POW deaths vary from the Soviet estimates of approximately 380,000, to the German figures which are closer to 1 million deaths throughout the war.”

Voiceover: “At this point the Germans expected the Soviets to stop and regroup. Afterall that’s what supply issues had forced the Soviets to do so many times before. But the Red Army had learnt its lessons, and their advance was far from over.

In early July, the Soviets moved on towards new targets, Kaunas, Grodno, Bialystok and Brest – continuing to advance at breakneck speed 20 or 25km a day. These attacks coincided with new Soviet offensives in other parts of the line.

In the north, the 1st Baltic front exploited the gap between Army Groups North and Centre, driving towards Šiauliai and then the Gulf or Riga which they reached on the 31st of July. Though the Germans would counter-attack and reopen communications in Mid-August, Army Group North was left in an extremely precarious position.

Meanwhile in the South, the Soviets launched their long-awaited attack against Army Group North Ukraine. But while the Germans had expected this, their units had been weakened to provide reinforcements to Army Group Centre. This resulted in yet another encirclement at Brody where yet more German soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. By the 1st of August the Soviets had reached the outskirts of Warsaw.”

Helen Upcraft: “With the arrival of Soviet troops in July 1944 the Polish Home Army decided to make their move and stage an uprising. They had hoped to take advantage of a harried German army, however Soviet forces unexpectedly halted their combat operations when approaching the eastern suburbs of the city. Not only did the Soviets halt their advance, but they failed to provide any support such as food, weapons or air support to the Polish Home Army.

It is believed that this lack of support was due to Stalin, who was hoping to install a Pro-Soviet, Pro Socialist leader in Poland. Whereas the Polish Home Army were still taking directives from the Polish Government in exile who were based in London at the time. Stalin did eventually allow the Western Allies to use Soviet airfields to carry out air drops into the city, but it was too little too late. A stalemate had been reached in the city and without Soviet military intervention the Polish Home Army had no choice but to concede.

This armband belonged to Anna de Laveaux, a fighter in the Polish Home Army. She wore it instead of a uniform. Identifying her as a legitimate combatant, it may have saved her from being executed after being captured.”

Voiceover:  “It is estimated that some 16,000 members of the Polish resistance and somewhere between 150-200,000 civilians were killed in the Uprising. The city was emptied by the Germans with thousands being sent to labour or concentration camps, and thousands more being displaced before the city was raised to the ground by the Germans. In the end what halted the Soviet advance was not German resistance, but Soviet exhaustion. Having advanced over 700km their logistics were simply at breaking point.

The German losses were immense, close to 30 divisions had been destroyed. Casualty figures vary, but were around 450k killed, wounded, or captured. The Soviets also suffered heavily, over 770k casualties. But this was a price they were willing to pay. The Soviets finally achieved a true deep battle victory. Destroying the entire German frontline and moving well past their pre-war borders.”

Helen Upcraft: “Operation Bagration was one of the Soviet Union’s largest military successes of the Second World War. It was proof of how far they had come and how much they had learned over the course of the war. In conjunction with Operation Overlord, Bagration put the Allies in a position to crush Nazi Germany from east and west. Within a year, the war would be over. 

And yet, despite all that, the operation is not well known in the West compared to the events of D-Day. There are several reasons as to why this might be, the predominate reason being the British and American involvement in D-Day would naturally be highlighted in popular Western culture. The later onset of the Cold War would pit these former Allies against eachother and lead to further downplaying of the Soviet contributions to the Allied victory during the Second World War.”

Voiceover: “Despite the catastrophic German losses, it would take yet more bloody fighting before the Soviets could reach Berlin and end the Second World War in Europe. But all that was made possible by Operation Bagration. According to leading Wehrmacht Scholar Robert Citino:

‘Operation Bagration was more than a victory. It was the victory, perhaps the greatest single win in all of military history.’”