Halliday, Corrie Alexander (Oral history)

British trooper and NCO served with Inns of Court Regt in London and at Sandhurst 1937-1939. Served as officer with 11th Hussars and attached to 13 Corps in North Africa 1940-1943. Captured and POW in Italy and Germany 1943-1945. Served with 11th Hussars in Berlin 8/1945 and with Lanarkshire Yeomanry in Scotland 1947-1948

REEL 1 Background in GB, 1918-1937: family; father's business; reason for family move to Devon; membership of Officers' Training Corps at Harrow School; visits to Germany in 1930's and change of attitude amongst Germans in 1937; leaving school and sporting achievements, 1937; effect of presence of Hitler Youth at rowing clubs on the River Rhine, 1937; details of education at Harrow School; training with Officers' Training Corps at Harrow School; obtaining employment as bank clerk in London, 10/1937. Recollections of period as trooper and NCO with Inns of Court Regt in London, GB, 1937-1939: background to and reasons for joining Territorial Army; strength of unit prior to and post Munich Crisis, 9/1938; organisation of regiment and role as Officer Producing Unit; his training in mechanized sqdn; drill; small arms training; map reading; monthy weekend training at Bisley; nature of cavalry drill. REEL 2: Continues: instruction on rifle and Bren Gun; amount of live firing on ranges; training with Webley MkIV .38/200 Service Revolver; importance of map reading and map reading exercises using trucks at Bisley; degree of wireless commnication training; learning to drive 15 Cwt truck and Light Tanks Mk IV during camp at Warminster, 1939; reverse steering problems on Light Tank Mk IV; attitude towards training in unit; regular squadron sergeant major and territorial commanding officer; origins of regiment's recruits; map reading training in drill hall; details of training iwth Light Mk IV tanks at camp at Warminister, 1939; internal communication inside Light Mk IV Tank and later problems experienced in North Africa; nature of tank training exercises daily vehicle and kit inspection during camp at Warminister; promotion to acting troop sergeant during camp at Warminister; attitude of recruits; use tented accommodation during annual camps. REEL 3 Continues: description of annual camp; degree on instruction recieved on vehicle maintenance; weekly and monthly training commitment with Inns of Court Regt; contrast in attitude to annual camp at Alton in 1938 and at Warminster in 1939; character of mobilisation, 1/9/1939. Recollections of training as officer with Royal Armoured Corps in GB, 1939-1945: reporting to Royal Military College Sandhurst; elementary test and and immediate commissioning of some of group; role of spokesman for group; invaluable experience of command; rate at which officer groups were going through Royal Military College Sandhurst, 9/1939-10/1939; general and training wireless; move to Bovington Camp; training on own programme as Territorial Army personnel; joining sergeants' mess at Bovington Camp; adherence to the cavalry timing and marching off parade ground at Royal Military College Sandhurst; lack of recreational facilities and story of refusal to open bar and how it dealt with. REEL 4 Food at Sandhurst good and treated the same as the regulars. They did not have to do kitchen duties and had orderlies to make beds and look after rooms. Time spent on intensive training. A wireless school and practised in addition in trucks in woods around Camberley. Possibly No. 11 sets: range up to ten miles. Taught procedures and simulated squadron nets. Were not taught to strip down radios. Taught morse: sometimes had to use in desert. Also taught phonetic alphabet for speech: it changed during the war. Had sport periods but cannot recall rugby or football at Sandhurst. Did PT periods outside or in gym, three days a week. Concentrated on wireless course. Mounted regular all night guards on garages and entrances, but possibly not every night: useful training for active operations. Reveille at about 0700, training about 0900 to 1800, then supper and sometimes a meeting afterwards up to 2100. Little weekday leave but some weekend leave. Sandhurst course about a month then transfer to Bovington for four week driving and maintenance course. Next intake two weeks after their arrival. Course involved fitting tracks on tanks, learning about engines, driving tanks. Used the A9 cruiser and Bren carriers, plus exercises in wheeled vehicles. Maintenance element partly based on models in classrooms. Course split, maintenance first two weeks then driving. He wanted nothing to do with tanks and was relieved when he learned that 11 Hussars were in armoured cars. Driving element involved both actually driving and commanding: regular instructor was in the tank for guidance initially and later sent out as solo crews to do set routes. Specifically trained in bad going. Keen attitude in his group was evident in the way training was tackled. At time of applying for 11 Hussars he had no idea what they were armed with and only opted for that regiment because of a family connection. He never trained in an armoured car and first saw one on joining regiment in Egypt. Notwithstanding dislike of tanks was prepared to fight his war in one to do his bit. Reference to written tests and a commanders certificate. Regular tests at different stages on course. Relations with the sergeant instructors. Main difference was age gap of some ten years and were reasonably friendly if sometimes making odd remarks. REEL 5. His being a trainee officer tempered sergeants' reactions. He used mess primarily to eat and read papers and magazines. Recalls reading an account of a labour camp written by Pastor Niemuller and account angered him and confirmed his conviction that we had to fight the war. Knowledge of concentration camps not widespread in 1939 but beginning to get through. The persecution of the Jews had been known about since before war was declared. Moved to Lulworth for gunnery course. He fitted into sergeants' mess at Lulworth better than at Bovington where the segregation from his group had come as something of a surprise. Separate messing but slept with group in barracks hut. Lulworth course included course on the Bren to point of stripping blindfold. Also taught Boys anti-tank rifle and 2 pdr gun and possibly the Vickers. Did not have Besa at Lulworth at that time: he first encountered it in January 1941 in Egypt when they refitted with Marmon Herringtons. At Lulworth, very little practice: probably fired only around a dozen shots of 2 pdr each. Static targets on Binden Hill fired at, at first from stationary platforms then from moving tank that ran along a set course from A to B and back. In practice could not hit target from moving platform but training directed at firing on the move. Can recall no intercom and thinks had to shout to halt tank and to indicate target to gunner. Very little room in turret and dangers of an opening breach, especially if vehicle moving. Training good for indicating the fundamental difficulties of gunnery. No moving targets. Used indoor RYPA for initial gunnery training for three weeks, and only the last week was on the ranges with live ammunition. Not taught anything on the theory of gunnery. Domestic arrangements at Bovington not as good as at Sandhurst as not designed to cater for budding officers: highly polished tables and candles at dinner with orderlies to wait as opposed to helping oneself to a bowl of soup. Food was soldiers' food but quite adequate. No guards at Lulworth or Bovington. Did some PT at Bovington but not at Lulworth: about two periods a week. Played a little rugby at Bovington and raised a scratch team against the staff. They were given some homework for the following day but local leave was possible in evenings: one of Westminster Dragoons later married barmaid of Seven Stars. Back to Sandhurst after gunnery course for some revision but did not seem to know what to do with them until commissions were confirmed. REEL 6 Called into CO's office to be wished good luck and then went off to join regiments. In first month at Sandhurst they had been given a lecture by senior member of staff who had served in WWI and told them that as subalterns their life expectancy at the front was about three weeks. Taking the oath involved marching in in turn by SM to Commandant who told them that their commission would be Gazetted and repeated the oath they had taken on enlistment. Allocation to regiments largely by chance: initially asked to select three regiment by order of choice and he had put 11 Hussars at top of list on basis that an uncle had served and been killed in 1915. Not aware of any of his intake who were rejected: impression that they could not afford to fail anyone. Contact with his regiment in his case was made easier as Sandhurst adjutant was an 11 Hussar who told him who the regimental tailor was. Officers' kit included cavalry twill cherry trousers for service dress with black shoes and socks and service dress tunic with regimental buttons, khaki tie and khaki collar for shirt, cavalry style greatcoat - double breasted, calf length with two rows of buttons, service cap and topee with regimental flash. Overalls for working. Mess dress obtained in Cairo, blues for winter, white tunic for summer, still with cherry trousers overall type fitting, mess cap with shiny peak, blue with cherry top. Beret with working dress was distinctive: chocolate brown with cherry band at bottom and this worn throughout: four tank officers who joined and initial wore black beret were told to wear the brown beret. In London managed to get kitted out in 48 hours. January to March sent to Catterick waiting for a draft, then home leave followed by posting to Liverpool for more hanging about: assigned no duties. Met 11 Hussar officer on staff at Catterick and went to dinner to be told about the regiment. Ordered to Southampton from Liverpool, very slow journey. Went to France on a ship with a draft which included a number of Gloucester Hussars who joined 11 Hussars in Egypt. Sailed at night and took train Le Havre to Marseilles. Draft was about 200 by time of sailing to France. Stopped off at Malta but did not disembark, and arrived Alexandria mid March 1940. Whole journey from Liverpool took about ten days. He believes were the last soldiers to reach Egypt via France: thereafter had to come the long sea route and he recalls no one else joining until August. French train was ordinary seated carriages. Alexandria to tented camp at Maadi outside Cairo via Egyptian train and finally regimental wheeled transport. On arrival at regiment parades and drill was prominent, starting at dawn as became too hot later in the day. REEL 7 Greeted by CO on arrival at Maadi. Regiments in Egypt living in peace time conditions. Posted to B Sqn. and given about a month's basic regimental training by RSM including drill. Also desert training in form of use of ground and map reading: quite different to previous as little cover and few landmarks. Also intercommunication training. Troop of three cars, only troop leader's car had radio for contact with SHQ: between cars in troop hand or flag signals, each car had a set of six signal coloured flags. More than 100 yds was difficult as hand signals difficult to see. Parades finished about 1800 and all officers except orderly officer went into Cairo for own social contacts: They were asked to join in but could not as insufficient money. Many officers had own horses and each officer was issued a charger (horse) and given a syce (Egyptian groom) allowance. Other officers friendly enough but he was seen as odd as he could not ride. Good officers mess, under canvas. Some of the Yeomanry draft were quite well to do and would probably have been more at home in the officers' mess but as not commissioned messed with the other ranks. A group of Rhodesians joined the regiment and some were split up among the squadrons. Driving and maintenance training on the Morris troop leaders' cars and the Rolls and regimental wireless procedures. Work paused at about midday and did not begin again until about 1530 - 1600. Drill parade early morning, then trained under squadron orders. Church parades on Sundays for which topees were worn. Service dress in drill worn during the day, with Sam Brown: belt had to be removed before entering the mess. Changed into blues or whites in evenings. Taught to drive both types of car and live fired both the Bren and the Boys: about four boxes of Bren ammunition but only about fifty for the Boys. Learning how to stow a car was an important item: Sqn. leader inspected the stowage to ensure everything there but details of stowage was up to individual car crews. First impressions of armoured cars. Rolls a particularly good desert car: faster and more comfortable than the Morris. Experience of various crew positions in Morris cars. REEL 8 Rolls turret more roomy than Morris. Use of compass: each car had a prismatic oil compass but also an Evans-Loam sun compass. Navigated daytime almost entirely by sun compass. Description of a sun compass: template discs fitted to a position on turret rim and direction indicated by a needle - or match stick when needle lost. Use of prismatic difficult adjacent to car so had to walk away about fifty yards then line up car on a bearing and check tracks for straight line. About six sun compass templates, changed about every two months as position of sun changed. Range of car an important lesson: range would depend on the going as amount of low gear work increased fuel consumption. Relationship of fuel and distance a key factor: 120 miles on a tank by road could be reduced by going to perhaps 40 miles. "Going" the expression used to describe ground conditions. Cars carried extra fuel as a tank found to be inadequate when operations began. Rolls radiators often boiled and after operations began they fitted "lp" (local pattern) condensers: at one time they had to put their drinking rations into radiators and were ordered not to move during the hottest part of day. Squadron training in desert around Maadi: no-one really knew what they were doing but training taken seriously. He learned by watching but had his own ideas: was dubious about use of signal flags and in fact did not use them in action. Training was laid out within the regiment but not aware of any printed manual. Moved out from Maadi about third week of May 1940 to area around Buq Buq. Continued training in this forward area: as an officer "under instruction" he was in a truck travelling with the troop. A track on the map could not be found so they made a track of their own to fit the map. Ration and fuel truck came up at night from SHQ about 30 miles back at Barani. Takes over 3 Troop at end of May on another officer leaving regiment. REEL 9 As detached troop became used to desert living, laagering and daily dispersal. Relationship with his instructing officer. Use of codes for personal messages. "Look and run away" philosophy of recce troops and judgement on how long to tarry. Instruction by explanation. Cairo area good for soft sand and navigation training, Buq Buq area camel scrub gave bumpy "going". Description of term "going", different kinds of terrain, effect on fuel. Distances between cars and effect of aircraft: aircraft never mentioned in training. Problems of mirage: not dealt with in training. On operations, observation often limited to 4 in 24 hours: night, early morning mist, good observation period - example of 20 miles observation. Mirage limits observation to 3 - 4 miles and identification limited to size and shape of the "blob". Evening observation period limited by looking into setting sun. Italian preference for living in groups in forts: routine movements in and out. Feelings on taking command of a troop. Calibre of and relationship with members of troop and officer's role. Importance of Sqn. SM for advice, esp. on personnel and discipline. Officer rather isolated in the troop: importance of co-operation with troop. REEL 10 Relationship with Sqn. commander & 2i/c and other members of rgt.: age gap an important factor. Method of man management within squadron. Officer's kit on car and gunner acts as batman and cook. Regional accents and Army slang. Paid little attention to campaign in France. Wireless silence on move to wire immediately prior to war. Sudan Defence Force inspect wire just before war. On night of 10 June gaps cut in wire and on first day (11 June 1940) was ordered to road between Capuzzo and Bardia to observe and report traffic. War greeted with relief. Standard procedure was a forward daytime position and pull back to a laager position at night with all three cars facing outward. Lack of wireless in troop defined that his first recce was in arrow head with him in lead. Opens fire on staff car at too great a range due to inexperience. Car steering breaks: attempts to pull car out with one of the Rolls. REEL 11 Car repaired by Sqn. fitters: scope of work done by Sqn. and Rgt. Rgt. fitters not 11 Hussars but treated as though they were. Maps of Egypt quite good but of Libya were just paper and with very little detail so navigation skills were important. Takes Brigadier Gott on recce over wire: he took over gunner's position. 14 June he observes other two squadrons of regiment "cavalry charge" on the Italian forts Capuzzo and Aziz and subsequently sent out as flank guard. He was last troop out as rear guard and Italians send out a patrol of trucks and tanks and he could not move fast enough because of camel shrub. One tank continues after him then comes to a halt: fires single Bren shots every half minute until two man crew get out and surrender. Italians had been told that they would be tortured and killed if captured by British. REEL 12 They rifled the tank and found the guns had very little traverse: passed this information on via regiment. Awarded MC for this action: told of the award by the Sqn, commander six or so weeks later. He knew nothing about medals and did not know what an MC looked like: in August on leave in Cairo his 2i/c sees him in Shepards and tells him that he should be wearing the ribbon. Day after winning medal ordered to Capuzzo: managed to loot some food and water, and fleas, and capture a motor cyclist. Brakes fail on road down escarpment and saved by wall edging road. Mechanical problems with Morris cars. Problems of fine sand in fuel: driver would clean filter at every stop when there was time. Rolls not as bad. Lower the fuel in tank, more likely to clog. Similar problem with guns. Description of cars moving at speed with plume of dust and pennants on radio masts as they go to support of an attack on an Italian column. Based on previous experience they attack three Italian tankettes from rear, 5 - 6 yds behind and firing with Boys. Pennants for identification of squadrons: within squadron one usually knew who was on left and right. No Italian air in first week. REEL 13 After 16 June regular daily single Italian recce aircraft flying north - south along wire: when first seen not recognized as there had been no training on aircraft recognition. No AA protection on cars, just turret guns. Flight of fighters often followed recce aircraft after couple of hours and attacked cars in patrol positions: concentrated on vehicle tyres which created a supply problem and prompted introduction of "run-flat" tyres. Protection was evasive driving on good going, sheltering in or by cars when movement not possible, and camouflage netting: description of use of camouflage netting. Passing on of experience to and beyond regiment. Radio net was within regiment and regiment back but no ground to air communications. Air to ground communication by Lysanders by throwing message out of cockpit. Air attacks were to some extent successful as it distracted from watching ground movement although not too many casualties. Agreed policy was to disperse personnel to slit trenches when attacked because trained men more valuable than cars: resulted in dropping to two car troops. Use of slit trenches prompted by these air attacks. RAF air cover was in form of Gloucester Gladiator, fair match for the CR42: the later Macchi arrived at about the same time as the Hurricanes arrived. Armour on cars sufficient protection against the Italian aircraft machine guns: armour piercing ammunition came later, especially on German aircraft. Introduced a "local pattern" AA mounting to the turret, just a pipe to take an additional Bren: used to take it turns to man this gun, which was a nuisance when not in use. Added after about 6 weeks of war: manufactured in Cairo and fitted locally by squadron fitter. Similar to local pattern condensers for Rolls. REEL 14 Description of main armament fittings. AA mount was useful for morale but problem to find place for additional ammunition. Gunfire against air or ground targets often more use for a morale effect than to cause casualties. Problem of the hum from radios disguising the approach of aircraft. Boys on very strong springs to absorb the strong recoil: effective up to 200 - 300 yds. Staying out in enemy territory overnight not usual but was done. He sometimes gave job of navigating to the other cars. Morale effect on car crews of air attacks: a state of jitters that got worse when the German airforce arrived. Description of taking cover in the car. Targets for Boys and Bren. Internal economy of squadron on active operations: rail and road heads to supply dumps by RASC, units sent regimental echelons to collect unit supplies and squadron echelons drew supplies from regimental distribution point. Need for echelon to have good navigator. Water a key factor: at one stage ordered not to patrol in heat of day. Water carried on cars in "fantassies": water always contaminated by fine sand. Fantassies about 20 gallons. REEL 15 Personal hygiene curtailed by lack of water. Description of Birs: Sheferzen could be seen 10 miles. Simply did not wash or shave. Additional petrol started to be carried early in operations because bad going affected notional range. Additional crate of two four gallon flimsy cans usually carried in each car: much of the petrol had often leaked out before delivery. Carried in turret and commander would stand on crate, which made riding easier as avoided having shoulders knocked against turret edges. Fumes in car were bad: lived with the danger of being hit. Main rations were bully and biscuits, margarine and plum jam if lucky. Bully could be stewed if one had water, fried if had marge and the clever ones could make fritters if had flour. Often too busy to eat. Tried for a hot meal in the mornings: laager overnight with one man on sentry for an hour apiece except radio operator who had to call in each hour. Often a thick mist at dawn so he took dawn watch to sometimes give them extra sleep. Frequent night patrols by infantry through the car positions. First thing was to disperse to forward to day observation positions when mist cleared, usually around 0730, and brew up on that position. Situation when reserve troop with squadron HQ, usually 20 - 25 miles back. Beyond 30 miles often out of radio range. Reference to cannibalising derelict cars for spares, which were very short, especially springs for Morris cars. Desert very cold in winter: water would freeze overnight. Also very wet, lots of mud and guns, radio and kit always wet in December and January. In summer it was advisable not to touch metal on sun side of car. REEL 16 Summer a constant dry heat: daytime would try and lay in shade under cars between 1100 and 1600, patrols done morning and evening. Morning mist sufficient to wet bedding. Spring weather marked by Khamsin and a particularly breathless kind of heat. Moving in Khamsin similar to moving at night with visibility down to 5 yards. In action would need to move and wait for visibility to clear to find out where one was. This sort of weather affected some individuals badly or exacerbated existing problems: specific case of one officer who had to be sent back to Cairo and B Sqn. commander who had to be repatriated to GB. Squadron HQ arrangements: R. Signals signaller on sqn. leader's car, regimental Corporal fitter, regimental signaller on 2i/c's car. Medical arrangements under SQMS who would ferry sick back to regt. HQ or the MO would come forward to sqn. Saw little of SHQ as troop leader, as even at rest was some distance from HQ and only normally saw Sqn. CO on coming into reserve and leaving. Casualties had to be of-loaded as soon as possible: could be dealt with on cars only on first aid basis, but did carry morphine. Anecdote of an engagement where he had to use morphine: in tablet form. His method of working with other two cars without radio was that they had to follow his lead: did not use any of the flag signalling that had been taught in training. If a casualty was taken on patrol would need to get him back to Sqn. HQ, or they would come forward to collect. Sqn. fitter had strong towing vehicle: conscious effort to rescue damaged cars and echelons often used captured load carriers. REEL 17 Patrol used as decoy to get gun troop into position for harassing fire and three camels in area mistaken for armoured cars in the mirage enabling cars to get away and escape shelling. Shadowed Italian advance Eastwards in to Egypt towards Barani area, September. Rain came early and flowers bloomed all over desert. Italian tactic in the advance was as a solid column with motor cyclist and light tank scouts and flank guards. He had no personal involvement in 'Jock Columns'. Went on a driving and maintenance refresher course in Cairo to improve overall maintenance in view of the many breakdowns, based on desert experience to date. Shortage of cars due largely to maintenance problems and troops down to two cars: uncertain whether four or five troops in the squadron. Degree of briefing given for Operation Compass: very little beyond their own specific tasks. Rum ration issued at outset of battle. REEL 18 'Going' problems on coast with boggy salt pans: inland of salt pans were coastal dunes and then high white sand inland dunes, with tracks on either side. Inland track being covered by another troop but Italian vehicles escaping Westwards on Northern, coastal track. He knocks out a lorry and blocks track then walks over to Northern track, directs crews of Italian vehicles backed up on the track to move North over dunes to surrender. 14 British crew in four cars collect around 2,000 prisoners and were ordered to march them in and handed them over to the RQM. Incident happened between Barani and Buq Buq. Received the bar to his MC for this action: he was surprised because there was nothing to it. Morale of these Italian troops was less broken than non existent, but Ariete later were quite good. Account of a patrol on Trigh Capuzzo in Sidi Rezegh - El Adem area to find a lost troop: was attacked by aircraft that knocked out the cars and dismounted crews approached by motor cycle troops. He advises six men with him to make an individual run for it: he himself makes a run then hides under rocks. Walks east after dark and picked up by friendly light tank. Ordered back to Cairo to refit and hitches series of rides as far as RAF at Bagush. REEL 19 Gets lift in plane with Group Captain Tedder. Given £30.00 to refit: regulation Army allowance for officer to replace official kit - did not cover personal possessions. Gets lift back with Fleet Air Arm, rejoins in area of Mechili about 10 January 1941. Operational area now Jebel El Akdar, which was to an extent cultivated and populated. Description of a standard recce patrol and the conclusions reached as a result of enemy reaction. Comment on improvement of complementary air recce: never given air recce photos in relation to patrols. Subsequent move into Jebel area produced very different kind of terrain: wooded foothills that closed visibility down to 300 - 400 yards. Reports from other units of mined tracks but could not avoid as could not get off tracks into trees. He had not encountered mines in the desert as they were mostly on flanks of the action but had encountered anti-personnel 'fountain pen' devices that blew fingers off when picked up. Mine detection methods: seldom on approach to a corner but more likely to be at your end of a straight stretch that could be covered by fire from the other end. They had no training in mine clearing and spent about two weeks in lifting mines themselves before being ordered, because of casualties, to leave alone and await specialists. "Push on" was the constant order from above at this time. Plentiful water in the Jebel and possibility of fresh meat in shape of chickens and sheep. Terrain mainly smallish pine and lot of scrub that gave good cover. No training for this kind of warfare and they learned from experience: for example need to look under wheels because of mines rather than concentrating on miles ahead. Psychological feeling of being watched all the time. Greeted by ululating villagers. Advance in this terrain was single file, moving by bounds about 200 yds between cars, similar to training in GB. REEL 20 The mine clearing sappers did not travel with the forward troops but probably with Sqdn HQ. He had been given an experimental vehicle to try out, name not known but with two man crew and looking a little like a small tank: ambushed on a patrol on which a war correspondent was present. Description of extricating car from the ambush and reaction to loss of two men. Maps of this area were captured Italian maps and quite good. Weather at that time was very wet and cold: slept for first time under a roof at Benghazi airfield then rejoined regiment in area of El Agheila early February. Encountered Me 110 for first time in that area: machine gunned the car and his light blue Lilo bed lying out to dry: asked permission to join the Sqn. CO to join him in his slit trench. No special provision made for domestic arrangements in recognition of the different weather conditions. Weather affected ways of working by making maps difficult to use and making the sun compass useless. No effect on radio unless water leaked into the set. After Me 110 attack took car to RHQ at El Agheila for regimental fitters to replace radiator. Anecdote of being given job of removing bodies from destroyed car in fortress when attacked by Stukas. REEL 21 Regiment ordered back to Cairo end February 1941. Hostile reception by Egyptians who stoned the cars: impression that they were pro-German. Re equipped with Marmon Herringtons, three car troops but still with only the troop leader with wireless: three man crews except troop leader with four. German participation at front resulted in the first two squadrons to be equipped being ordered to front before B Sqn was fully kitted out. The guns were the heavy and light Besas and B Sqn. had to fit the guns, still packed in grease, on their move up to the front some ten days after other two sqns. No significant difference between commanding a Marmon Herrington car and troop. Road movement was different as result of air threat as cars now travelled 200 - 300 yards apart as opposed to 100 yards typical in May 1940. Similar lateral distances applied when deployed on the desert. Marmon Herrington not liked as sluggish and not a powerful engine, with weak springs that also tended to make travel slower: also smaller turret than the Morris. In MH it was difficult to take over the guns oneself: in Morris he usually fired guns himself but had to rely on gunner in MH. Wireless operator in similar position on MH to position on Morris: down in body of vehicle. Impression that armour was essentially the same. Still carried spare petrol, again in the turret: as a result rations tasted of petrol. Turret still hand traverse. Stowage capacity essentially the same. Reference to changes in regimental and Squadron command. On way to front he encountered a lot of miscellaneous transport going the other way, 'a rabble', no sign of attempts to organize. At front they had to be very wary of German armoured cars, who used them aggressively in similar fashion to the British: particularly wary of the eight wheelers which were faster and better armed than the British cars and good over bad going: usually found with two four wheelers. REEL 22 Anecdote of an aggressive German car patrol in pursuit when his spring broke. Second anecdote of patrol near Bir Sheferzen when German car patrol attempted an ambush from behind mound of the Bir: escaped because of experience. Comparison between aggressive and 'interesting' operations against Germans as opposed to stereotyped Italian operations. Training of other Allied troops in recce work by having individuals attached to troop. Difficulty in use of codes: used mostly when not in contact with enemy. He himself not sure how their doctrine actually worked: appeared to evolve out of experience and discussion. He has no recollection of any training manuals. The difficulties of decisions that had to be made in course of recce work. Desert the best place to fight a war: no people or impossible terrain. Also had a troop from another regiment under his instruction: his car attached to their troop. Anecdote illustrating that enemy knew whereabouts of the standing patrols and best times to shell them. No recollection of specific orders for Battleaxe. He recalls becoming very jittery at about this time, after year of troop leading, and asks Sqn. leader for a transfer: gets interview with CO who simply orders him back to duty. After Battleaxe his sqn. watching the coastal area where he had been before. Air attacks prevalent at the time and had section of two Bofors attached for some patrols: anecdote of attack by Hurricane. RAF officer attached to troop for a day who commented that anything west of Barrani was considered by RAF as fair game: made them wary of all aircraft. No ground to air communication or organized recognition system. REEL 23 Anecdote of German fighting patrol of an eight wheeler which used terrain to knock out an entire troop and he was ordered to take over. He arranged with another troop some eight miles inland to keep a watch on the inland track which could not be watched from his own troop position and thus avoided a similar ambush. This observation successful in spite of mirage: if observer is static then anything moving is likely to be enemy and type of vehicle often recognizable from its general shape. The regiment withdrew to Cairo for retraining and re equipment about August 1941 but does not recall details. Recalls playing some cricket and socialising in the evenings. Middle East forces were being built up in summer 1941 and he was asked in October if he would care to join a new corps being set up to command armour, 30 Corps: 13 infantry corps had already been set up. Pope was commander designate and had sent message ahead that he wanted an adc with desert experience and he accepted. Ordered to fit out the corps HQ mess. Injured his toe two days before he was due to go up to the desert to show Pope around: Pope and those with him killed on take-off from Heliopolis. Cleared up Pope's effects. Willoughby Norrie takes over but has his own adc but arranges for his transfer to Godwin Austin's staff as supernumerary adc to 13 Corps, again with duties related to arranging the mess. Difference in viewpoint between recce troop leader and corps hq: troop leader only has about a ten mile front and about a forty mile line back to squadron. Lieutenant in midst of senior staff officers nearly all regulars. Particularly palled up with Intelligence officer as being the other end of the intelligence work he used to do at the sharp end. REEL 24 Godwin Austin had good reputation from East Africa but was new to desert and 'not a desert man'. Confided that he did not understand the desert and that he relied on his BGS, General John Harding, whom he called 'the good John'. Effectively allowed Harding to run operations. Other duties as ADC: to be a 'fount of knowledge' for the general; to entertain visitors to the mess; take over from regular adc for visits by general as required, for which needed to know lie of land in area of visit; needed general knowledge of running and layout of corps and names of commanders of formation being visited. Had to be aware of names and functions of corps staff. One role was a confidant to General and to provide a channel of communication alternative to the official. Three messes, according to rank: General's mess, Lt Colonel and Major's mess and junior ranks' mess. Coming from an armoured car unit he got job of looking after General's staff car. Other ranks mess under direction of Camp Commandant. Corps HQ fairly static, even in operations, and seldom moved more than once a month. Dispersal was an issue with something the size of a corps hq: took long time to make way round. His trips with the General to the formations in the corps showed a totally different kind of war to the one he had been involved in as troop commander. He had batman at corps. Even on active operations the mess ran on the white cloth principle although with utilitarian cutlery, no silver or crystal glasses. He met and spoke with Martel about armoured car work in the desert. Duke of Gloucester visited for three days and he took over as Duke's Military Assistant when the regular man went sick. Also met Roy Farran who came to visit with Jock Campbell: had known Farran with Inns of Court. Had a long night chatting over a bottle of whisky the night before Campbell was killed in a car accident: he found later that Campbell had himself been driving. Anecdote about meeting Farran after war following his work with the Arabs. REEL 25 Visit by Army commander, Alan Cunningham. Cunningham's ADC, who was known by Halliday from school days, warned him to advise Godwin Austen not to take much notice of what Cunningham said. Operation Crusader was a busy period at Corps HQ but does not recall details: they entered Tobruk, perimeter about January 1942 and he recalls problems with the heavy office and radio bodied lorries in the mud. During the battle there was little for the General to do so the two adc's had to keep him company and talk to him. Corps entered Tobruk at night and was then cut off for a period. Subsequently moved to Benghazi area where they had a visit from William Bullet, personal representative of Roosevelt. Petrol supplies a problem with discrepancies between what base believed was getting through and what was being received: he notices that petrol lorries on way to front were dribbling petrol out onto the track. Shows General who takes up with QM but is assured that adequate supplies getting through. He believes this to be a factor in failure to hold Benghazi soon after. Godwin Austen later tells him he had argued against holding Benghazi given petrol situation and as a result was removed. Comment on inadequacy of British flimsy tins as opposed to German 'Jerry cans'. Gott takes over beginning of February 1942 and brings his own adc but keeps Halliday on as adc on same duties. Gott eventually decides that insufficient work for two ADCs and promoted him to Captain and appointed him as liaison officer to the armoured corps. Liaison officer an established appointment on corps staff, each working to one of the formations in the Corps. Liaison officer duties: knowledge of corps plans, layout of component formations and supporting forces and arms, with particular reference to the formations with whom liaising. REEL 26 His duties were to provide link between 13 and 30 Corps. 13 Corps plan was taken to 30 Corps to ensure they understood and comments brought back: saved signals traffic and time. Brought back details of 30 Corps dispositions. He found the work congenial and a development of his previous work as troop commander. This was in area of El Adem - Gazala end April, beginning May. He was aware that a major operation was due and delayed leave in order to take part. Comment on vulnerability of a corps hq with its mass of soft vehicles with only a troop or so of light tanks as protection. Rommel attacks 26 May, and British units falling back as he makes way to 30 Corps HQ, which was packing up to move so decides to go back to El Adem box. Bumps some Germans and turns East then an accompanying truck stops and he turns back and is captured by a truck of German infantry. He tried to spit on map to rub out talc markings of 13 corps dispositions. Since that day no-one, Italian, German or British, has ever asked how he was captured. All he had with him was what he stood up in, plus a 'British warm' coat in his truck. Germans treated them well, then handed over to Italians, which was the standard procedure. He finds a blanket and slips into a slit trench while being marched away and begins to walk East at night but is quickly picked up by a staff car and this time kept by the Germans for about three days. Speaks to a German officer who had been in last war and believed that Germany would lose war. Eventually handed over to join a group of prisoners where there was severe water shortage among prisoners and some died of thirst before water got through. While with front line German unit under no physical restraint and not interrogated. Loaded into lorries and flown from Barce to reception centre at Bari. Infested with lice and fleas at that camp: wooden huts. Adjacent to accommodation for Italian troops returning to and from leave. Food was basic, pasta and dry bread. Name, rank and number taken and passed to Red Cross for advice to family. After ten days, moved in groups to other camps by train. He sold watch to a civilian on the train then jumped the train with a friend, falling into a ditch. After dark they encounter a sentry and barrier across road so take shelter in a field of maize. They had no particular plan. Dawn the next day walked past some peasants working in fields and went into a copse where made a fire and stripped off to dry clothes and cook some potatoes. REEL 27 Arrested by four Carrabinieri: put in town jail in Immola, near Bologna. Escorted by four soldiers to the prison POW camp at Montalbo where they should have gone to. As a result of the escape they were given a sentence of 30 days solitary confinement but as only one cell they served it together. Were given cigarettes through a hole in the wall by a fellow prisoner, an 11 Hussar captured some time before, Tommy Pitman. Camp had about 80 officers. Good intelligence in camp gained through contact by Italian speakers talking to guards. No organized work in an officers' camp but work parties organized in Non-Commissioned Officers' and Other Ranks' camps. Guards in officers camps supposed to be more numerous and keener: there were OR prisoners to act as batmen etc. Officers also responsible for organizing camp canteen in conjunction with Italian authorities. Role of SBO. Secret organization of security and escape run by other senior officers. Escape officer and two aides vetted each escape scheme. Understood that no-one would break parole if allowed out on 'parole walks'. Very little meat but lot of vegetables: rice, lots of pumpkin and pasta. Red Cross parcels: good food and a pkt. cigarettes in each for currency and bribing guards, which was itself useful as created opportunity for blackmail. Sometimes detailed to create deliberate disturbances to aid an escape. He was moved after about two months to Camp 20 at Garvi about 20 miles north of Genoa, specially for escapees. Built on rocky hill and access only via a 100 yard tunnel. He was there from autumn 1942 to September 1943 when taken out by Germans at time of Italian armistice. Demeanour of Italian guards became friendlier as Allies moved further north: were fairly friendly with the Italians. He was not aware of any clandestine radio in Garvi: Italian newspapers readily available and the Italians kept prisoners reasonably informed. Italian commandant approached to release prisoners on news of the armistice but refused although they were no longer interested in guarding prisoners. Individual groups of prisoners made own plans for escape, mainly by hiding and hoping to remain hidden until Germans had gone with remaining prisoners. Germans only took a couple of days to take over the camp and a couple more days to find everyone and move the prisoners out. REEL 28 Has no personal knowledge of orders coming into camps from War Office but knew it happened: at one time near the end of the war they were ordered not to escape. Was not interrogated, even in prison camp, except in respect of the manner of his escape. From Garvi by lorries to transit camp near Verona, thence by train in cattle trucks via Brenner Pass, Innsbruck to Munich. Some Italian prisoners on same train: one was shot in escaping. A few British also escaped. Negligible feeding and sanitation arrangements on the journey: German guards were 'back street Germans', not fighting troops. Transit camp at Munich, adjacent to camp of Russians: very little food and water and minimal washing and sanitation. Anecdote of two officers who got away through contacts made at the transit camp via Munich and Spain. After a week moved with others from Garvi by train on to Rotenburg on the Fulda River North of Frankfurt. They made another escape bid by jumping from carriage window with eight or so others. Walked back into Munich with a friend, posed as Hungarian workers and got tickets on a train. With dawn their clothing gave them away and they were re-arrested: his own British warm had red 'PG' painted on the back so he kept his back to walls. Back to transit camp and put into cells: threatened with pistol by German NCO and they burst out laughing then demanded to see an officer. Thirty days solitary again: they quite enjoyed as a change from being cooped up with other people then a tiring journey. Then moved on to join the others at Rotenburg. Good escape committee. Two types of prisoner: those who had been there for a long time and were content to stay and the active escapers. Rotenburg an ex girls' school with about 8 or 10 officers in their dormitory. REEL 29 About 200 officer prisoners and some soldiers to do various jobs. Combination of fraternization with German guards for information and threat that they had better treat prisoners well as all guards' names and numbers known. Many guards had been wounded on Eastern front: afraid of Russians and to a degree played up to the British. Conscious propaganda campaign against German guards based on progress of war. After D Day living conditions became increasingly difficult as the Germans themselves had little food. Contingency plans for a breakout if Germans decided to kill off prisoners. Well organized escape plans. Lookout man for group using clandestine wireless. He produced a news bulletin for the camp based on the German news, as a cover operation. Description of his 'dozy' mental state, result of pow life. He had gambled in Italy but studied German in Germany, and played bridge. 'Camp money' was issued for purchase of items in canteens etc: the amount received in camp was deducted from pay by the War Office. Most people studied something: in Italy he had studied Italian and read the newspapers and listened to the radio that the guards switched on to the camp speakers for the prisoners. Classes sometimes run by people who knew something. Differences in attitude between Italians and Germans. Built an ice rink and played ice hockey. Very cold winter and dormitories had old style radiators, but never very hot. REEL 30 Contingency plans for end of war: end of war in sight and prisoner morale rose while German morale dropped. Germans tended to look on prisoners as friends who could put in a word at the end. Camp not liberated but Germans ordered them to form up and march out: SBO decided to accept and not attempt a break-out. He had impression that prisoners were going to be used as hostages / bargain counters. Prisoners walked deliberately slowly and did little more than 5 miles a day. This about March 1945: marched for about a week and covered only 30 - 50 miles, billeted on farms en route and found villagers friendly and keen to explain no-one there was a Nazi. Additional food in form of eggs and chickens. Ended up in a farm when Americans caught up with them: Germans mostly just disappeared. He was ill with stomach bug. Americans flew them back to Brussels, then again by air to GB. He recalls no debriefing of any kind by anyone. Just sent home on leave, no warning to family: about 2 stone underweight on return. Spent couple of months resting and was at home for VE day. Poor mental state. He got alcoholic poisoning in Brussels: bought and drank bottle of champagne, while still ill with stomach bug. No specific medical treatment arising from the stomach ailment. On arrival in GB managed to arrange to stay with nearby friend's family with a friend. Went to Sandhurst for a refresher course on RAC matters: he could see no point but realised Japanese war still on so he used contacts to gain entry into SAS for posting to Far East. At end of war in East in August he arranged his release from SAS: at that time of the war one could do these things: sympathy and goodwill and contacts would pull strings: Ray Farran was instrumental. Chose SAS because they had recce role not unlike 11 H. He also knew David Stirling and some others at Garvi: he did not want to go back to regimental soldiering. His fitness for the work would have been tested in training. He eventually did rejoin 11 Hussars in Berlin about August 1945 as a Lieutenant but was made up to Captain after a couple of weeks, and subsequently Major in command HQ Sqn. Role of regiment was policing, as much the Russians as the Germans. They were in Spandau Barracks, after Russians had left. Initial posting was to a troop in D Sqdn for about six weeks. Regiment had instituted a riding school that everyone had to attend at 6am every day. Escapade on horse with Russian sentries. REEL 31 Equipment of Regiment in Berlin Daimler armoured cars and scout cars but he had no experience of them in use except in street patrols. In Berlin had more trouble with Russians who came into British sector and got drunk than they did with Germans. Guard duties at Spandau. Hectic social life: all rather pointless. Commanded a fighting troop only for six weeks then made commander of HQ Sqn. Duties. Demob and leave schemes: Python, LILOP (leave in lieu of Python), LOLLIPOP (Lots of little local leaves in lieu of Python), SEWLROM (special end of war leave for officers and men). As result manning levels very low. Ordered out of Berlin Jan. 1946 to Wolfenbutel (sp?) near Hamburg/Bremen. Horses went with regiment and the problem of getting the German grooms out through the Russian zone, organized by RSM. Officers could leave most things to NCOs. Little to do. Sport, especially rugby. Although all pointless he opted for DV2 - voluntary deferment of demob for two years, to give him a breathing space to decide what to do with life. Dropped back to Captain when someone returned to rgt., and was posted as 2i/c C Sqn. Applied for British Army of the Rhine <BAOR> course with the French Army although spoke little French and sent to Paris then to Saumur and joined about seven others from different countries. Three months of great fun: they had access to cigarettes and French did not so loaded up every weekend when on leave in Paris: Christopher Soames was the contact. Fixed himself up with a posting for last year of service: adjutant to Lanarkshire Yeomanry at Carluke: no regiment, only an office with no-one in it. One parade a week with very few attendees: does not recall whether regiment was armoured or not. Met a cousin at this time who was a sheep farmer in New Zealand who asked him to join him but was difficult to get a boat. He went to a wedding and met someone who introduced him to a cousin in the Port Line who arranged for him to become a crew member on one of their boats, about March 1947. REEL 32 The New Zealand decision not taken lightly: in a very unsettled state like many who had been pow's, who all thought they were round the bend and would have trouble in settling into civilian life. All ex-pow's had to go to a psychiatrist but he ducked the interview. While on his own in Lanark he went on long walks trying to work out why he had survived the war: felt there was nothing left and came close to suicide as he could see no point in it all. What stopped him was existence of family. His feeling of isolation from civilian life: difficult to correlate the three modes of existence, civilian, pow, action. Feeling that they (ex POWs) would find it difficult to behave in an acceptable manner and he was scared of being considered odd although there was no evidence that anyone did think like that. One did not discuss these feelings, except on one occasion on the return to the GB. What worried him most was the future: restless and could not even settle to read a book: had done a lot of that in camp. He decided that he needed a tiring labouring job that would exhaust him physically so that the mental state would be put in the background. It worked: stayed with cousin on sheep farm for six months. Went to join a friend from pow camp who was physically making a sheep farm, so still a simple and physically demanding job. Stayed for six months. Went to Wellington to apply for a grant, during course of which he met his wife who was working with Embassy. Tried dairy farming but had to give up as he was subject to cow pox. Series of short term jobs, including gardener to Air Marshall Sir Keith Park. Gained commission as Captain in NZ Army and employed as instructor in NZ Armoured Corps and later adjutant to half a dozen Territorial units. Married 22 Dec 1950 as he was tired of waiting. He went for promotion exams but left to sell insurance when first son born. Wife has breakdown. Second son born just before returning to GB and two others after return. Series of jobs and difficulty in keeping on top of things: shelved nearly all previous connections, GB and NZ. Built life on his family. Never felt he got over the war. Effects of difficult early life. He coped by sweeping war under the mental carpet.