description
Object description
British officer served with Logistic Support Coy attached to 173rd Airborne Bde, US Army in Vietnam, 1965-1966; served with 8th Royal Australian Regt, 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam, 1969-1970
Content description
REEL 1 Recollections of operations as second in command of Australian Logistic Support Coy attached to 173rd Airborne Bde, US Army in Vietnam, 1965-1966: background to deployment to Vietnam; character of unit; arrival at Tan Son Nhut Airport in Saigon, 5/1965; arrival at Bien Hoa Camp; digging in for preparations for possible attack on Ho Chi Minh's birthday; defence of Bien Hoa perimeter; question of difference in standard of training between American and Australian troops; his training American unit in ambush precautions; training and operational background of Australian troops. Recollections of training instructor with 8th Bn Royal Australian Regt in Australia and Malaya, 1966-1969: posting to training depot; character of Australian conscription; posting to 8th Bn Royal Australian Regt.
REEL 2 Continues: reception on arrival at unit and his allocation to C Coy; training exercise in Queensland, 1967; garrison duties in Malaya, 1968-1969; further training at Kunungra; transfer to Administrative Coy; opinion of national servicemen and regulars. Recollections of operations with 8th Bn Royal Australian Regt, 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam, 1969-1970: arrival at Vung Tao; question of security at Nui Dat; intensity of operations in Phuc Tui; character of triangular ambushes; opinion of South Vietnamese Army and regime.
REEL 3 Continues: reliability of Catholic refugees from North Vietnam; character of Phuc Tui Province; strategic hamlet system; degree of support voluntarily given to Vietcong; Vietcong attacks on communication network; opinion of South Vietnamese regime; patronising of local orphanage; attitude of Vietnamese to foreign presence; drugs problem in US Army; speech he gave on taking over A Coy, 1970; incident of platoon taking heavy casualties through mines; leaving Vietnam, 12/1970.
REEL 4 Continues: handing over Nui Dat Camp to South Vietnamese Army; refusal of Vietnamese to sign for equipment left behind by Australians; occupation of Excreta Hill; state in which American troops had left Excreta Hill; signs of demoralisation of American troops on Excreta Hill; American method of rotating troops; contrasting discipline between American and Australian troops; supply of food during patrol; role of A Coy clearing Firebase Bond; fire support from artillery, helicopter gunships and Douglas C-47 Gunship 'Puff the Magic Dragon'; method of clearing Firebase Bond.
REEL 5 Continues: consolidating position at Firebase Bond; Vietcong's wish to avoid attrition; negative aspects of body count idea; occasion when Vietcong made a stand at The Horseshoe; forcing down of helicopter by Vietcong during The Horseshoe action; how search of battlefield after The Horseshoe action accounted for only five bodies; outcome of action and actual body count; Vietcong exploitation of American/Australian obsession with body counts; use of Surrendered Enemy Personnel and defectors; capture of Vietcong POW after ambush using Claymore Mines.
REEL 6 Continues: degree to which Vietcong would surrender; attitude towards Vietcong; killing of two Vietcong women by Claymore Mine; Vietcong clothing and equipment; distinguishing Vietcong from civilians; fire discipline in Australian Army; comparison between regulars and conscripts; question of why Malayan Emergency was defeated yet Vietnam insurrection succeeded; comparison of New Villages system in Malaya as compared with strategic hamlets in Vietnam; attitude of Chinese Vietnamese towards Vietnam War; problems caused during tour by having too much equipment; US Army use of 'prophylactic fire'.
REEL 7 Continues: question of casualties caused by accidental fire.