Description
Object description
British officer served as liaison officer to Chetniks with Special Operations Executive in Yugoslavia, 6/1943-5/1944
Content description
REEL 1 Recollections of period as liaison officer to Chetniks with Special Operations Executive in Yugoslavia, 6/1943-5/1944: background to joining Special Operations Executive in Cairo, Egypt, early 1943; initial meeting with Basil Davidson on allocation to Yugoslav Section; training received prior to mission; directives received for mission to Yugoslavia; his parachute drop into Yugoslavia, 6/1943; initial encounter with Draža Mihailović's Chetniks; Chetnik organisation; plan to move south into Macedonia; German-Bulgarian drive against guerrillas in area; escape from Bulgarians.
REEL 2 Continues: nature of wireless link with Cairo in Egypt; command area and contact with Chetnik leaders; his reconnaissance of operational area, 6/1943; problems delaying start of operations until 7/1943; poor communication links with Draža Mihailović; comparison of role of Nedic forces in Yugoslavia and Vichyites in France; destruction of railway line to Salonika, Greece, 9/1943; lack of supplies recieved by Chetniks from Special Operations Executive in Egypt in comparison with those received by Yugoslavian Partisans; achievements of sabotage operations, autumn, 1943; activities of Robert Purvis in organising Chetnik operations against Germans.
REEL 3 Continues: his reaction to lack of support received from Special Operations Executive in Cairo, Egypt, autumn, 1943; further details of communications problems experienced, autumn 1943; his mission to Albanian guerrillas in Kosovo area, 9/1943; Albanian guerrillas' request for supplies; size of Albanian guerrilla forces; D Signal system indicating degrees of priority and reaction of Headquarters, Special Operations Executive in Cairo, Egypt to it's misuse; question of contrast between British Broadcasting Corporation's reporting Chetnik activities as those of Yugoslav Partisans, 9/1943; question of lack of partisan activity against Axis forces in Leskovac area.
REEL 4 Continues: how he used his influence to try and stop Chetnik-Yugoslav Partisan conflict; narrow escape during partisan attack, autumn 1943; planning attack on German airfield and receiving news of switch in British support from Draža Mihailović to Josip Tito, 12/1943; Royalist character of Chetnik forces in area; question of relations between Chetniks and Nedic forces; question of collaboration in occupied Europe; situation for Chetniks in relations to Axis forces after 12/1943; his position and relations with Chetniks from 12/1943.
REEL 5 Continues: organisation of Special Operations Executive test of combativeness of Draža Mihailović's forces; Draža Mihailović's response to test; concern at Headquarters, Special Operations Executive in Cairo, Egypt about Draža Mihailović's possible response to test; question of Chetniks taking reprisal actions against Allies over their switch to supporting Yugoslav Partisans; question of local population's support for Yugoslav Partisans and not Chetniks; technique developed for blowing railway lines and how it differed from official Special Operations Executive recommendation; his train blowing exploit and how he was reprimanded for it, 2/1944; reasons for two month delay in his evacuation from Yugoslavia.
REEL 6 Continues: how he left Yugoslavia; treatment of shot down aircrew by Chetniks and Yugoslav Partisans; relative size of areas held by Chetniks and Yugoslav Partisans; problems of aircraft landing and taking off from evacuation strips; defence of airstrips by Chetniks; treatment of British Liaison Officers by Chetniks on return to Bari, Italy; question of pro-Yugoslav Partisan atmosphere in Bari, Italy, 5/1944; question of Chetnik expectations on liberation of Yugoslavia; change in Chetnik attitude towards fighting Germans and Yugoslav Partisans; his meeting with James Klugmann in Cairo, Egypt, early 1943.
REEL 7 Continues: Reflections on operations with Special Operations Executive in Yugoslavia, 6/1943-5/1944: sketch of activities with Special Operations Executive after return to Italy, 5/1944; effect of reading book 'Tito's Flawed Legacy' (1985) by Nora Beloff; documentary sources at the Public Records Office he used for his researches; preparations for his book 'The Rape of Serbia' (1990) based on his research; nature of argument and research of work; opinion of why Josip Tito was supported by British; opinion as to why Draža Mihailović believed British Liaison Officers to be spies.
REEL 8 Continues: opinion of effect of Special Operations Executive switch from Chetniks to Yugoslav Partisans; opinion of status of James Klugmann's status as Soviet agent; relationship between German Army's escape from Greece in 1944 and failure to support Chetniks; opinion of reasons for late arrival of Yugoslav Partisans in Serbia.