Moulton, James Louis (Oral history)

British staff officer served with Headquarters, 3rd Commando Bde on Malta, 1952-1954; served as staff officer with Royal Marines at Portsmouth, GB, 1954-1957; served as Chief of Amphibious Warfare at War Office in London, GB, 1957-1961

REEL 1 Recollections of period as staff officer with Headquarters, 3rd Commando Bde on Malta, 1952-1954: posting to unit; plans to evacuate civilians from Egypt; character of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron; exercises in assault landings; development of techniques and equipment; command and control; opinion of quality of naval communications; advantages of headquarters ship; training areas; presentation of colours; character of exercises; assault landing exercise at night on Malta; basic principles of landings operations; co-operation with other supporting arms; training of national servicemen; attitude to service in Canal Zone in Egypt; desert training. Recollections of period as staff officer with Royal Marines at Portsmouth, GB, 1954-1957: idea of commando ships. REEL 2 Continues: selling idea of commando carriers by presentation; staff objections to use of helicopters; scenario of intervention using helicopters in Middle East; capabilities of helicopters and tactics; initial experiment to transport vehicles by helicopter; role of commando carriers as part of a task force; limitations of using Royal Marines without supporting arms; question of lack of landing resources; characteristics and capabilities of operating from HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion. Recollections of period as Chief of Amphibious Warfare at War Office in London, GB, 1957-1961: arrival at War Office, 1957; role of Chief of Amphibious Warfare; relationship with Chiefs of Staff; subordinates and staff. REEL 3 Continues: lack of interest in amphibious warfare; main areas of interests of British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force; attitude of Secretary for Defence Duncan Sandys towards plans for amphibious carriers; change in attitude of Lord Louis Mountbatten; lessons learnt from Suez Crisis; plans for new ships for assault landings; promotion of new ideas and design parameters; capacity of new assault ships; intended use of brigade group for amphibious landings; characteristics of Landing Craft Assault (LSA) and Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM); assault landing techniques. REEL 4 Continues: reasons for obstructions in War Office over assault ship development; necessity of decision on amphibious warfare; use of personal contacts to break deadlock; writing paper on amphibious warfare; arranging presentation to Secretary of State; question of Chiefs of Staff lack of information and interest about recent developments, 1959 especially with United States Marine Corps; how Chiefs of Staff won over by presentation; arrangements to order ships; plans to co-operate with airborne forces; summary of policy of amphibious warfare; length of construction time for ships; arguments used to oppose development of amphibious warfare.