Description
Physical description
badge
A French grey rectangle of woollen cloth.
History note
The badge is a simple grey ('French Grey') rectangle, duplicating the badge of the Canadian 3rd Division of the First World War. An identical patch was worn by 3rd Division, Canadian Army Occupation Force after the end of Second World War.
The Second World War patch was formally approved by CMHQ on 15 August 1941.
In common with all other Second World War Canadian formations, in addition to this plain patch, corps and services units of the Division (eg: Signals, Service Corps, Ordnance, Medical, etc.) initially wore a distinction superimposed on the parent formation's patch. This was gradually phased out by the summer of 1944.
For notes on corps and services distinctions, see INS 78.
Being of woollen cloth, this particular badge may predate November 1942. Equally, it may also date from the immediate post-war (CAOF) period.
Second World War formation patches and unit shoulder titles were produced in three materials, woollen cloth, felt and printed cotton. Of these, felt was probably the least common. Both Canadian and British firms produced the woollen versions but, particularly in Britain, there were problems with supply and with the colour-fastness of the dyes. From November 1942 a printed cotton material with a strong backing became available in the UK, often now referred to as 'canvas'. After initial production problems with skewed shapes and letters, most patches and titles produced in the UK were in this material. It was supposed not to fray, run or fade but complaints about quality began to emerge around October 1944. A request to return to wool does not appear to have been possible before the end of the war. However, orders placed for patches for the CAOF appear to have specified woollen material.
The CAOF (Canadian Army Occupation Force) was based on 3rd Division and chose to adopt the same basic patch. The CAOF was distinguished from 3rd Division by the addition of a grey bar of the same material as the main patch, 3ins. x 0.5ins, worn below the formation patch. This was in addition to the usual coloured Brigade bar above the patch by Brigade HQ personnel.
> Formation history: On 17th May 1940 the Canadian Government announced its intention to raise a Corps HQ and a third division. There were initial delays in selecting units for the division because it was politically important to ensure that all regions of the country were represented in fighting formations. The Division did, however, avoid the need for early reorganization faced by its two predecessors because it formed on the then-current British organization of three brigades each of three infantry battalions rather than of three infantry and one machine-gun battalion. Divisional, brigade and services headquarters were formally authorized on 5 September 1940 and the Division concentrated for training in Nova Scotia where it also became the operational reserve of the new national defensive organisation, the Atlantic Command.
The bulk of the Division transferred to the UK in July 1941, being virtually complete by September. It undertook defence duties in Sussex where it trained extensively. In July 1943 it was selected as the Canadian assault formation for the invasion of North West Europe. The Division trained with, and was ultimately carried into the assault by, naval Force J, the Dieppe raid naval force, which had been kept in being to provide a 'laboratory' for combined operations assault techniques. They and the Division were the first to test the assault methods then being developed when they took part in Operation 'Pirate' in October 1943, an assault exercise in Studland Bay. Later exercises included 'Savvy' in February 1944 (which successfully proved the viability of SP field artillery firing from landing craft on the run-in to the beaches), 'Trousers' in April 1944 (which tested the naval landing forces) and 'Fabius III' in May 1944, the nearest thing possible to a dress rehearsal for the invasion.
Until October 1943 the Division was under command of 1 Canadian Corps. When that Corps was sent to the Mediterranean the Division came under 1 British Corps and it was under 1 Corps that the Division landed on D Day. 3rd Canadian Division's assault area was Juno, with 3rd British Division on their left and 50th British Division on their right.
The Division, like the two British assault Divisions, was on a special assault establishment. One Troop of each Battery of the Divisional Anti-Tank Regiment (3rd) was equipped with 3' M10 SP equipments and the Divisional LAA Regiment (4th) was wholly equipped with SP Bofors on truck chassis. All three Divisional artillery regiments (12, 13 & 14 RCA) were converted to SP (105mm Priests) with a fourth (19 RCA, also 105mm SP) added from Army assets, all of which were to fire from their landing craft onto designated targets during the run-in to the beach.
79 Armoured Division provided specialist obstacle breaching teams, including the Crab anti-mine flail tanks of B Squadron 22 Dragoons from 30 Armoured Brigade, and the armoured bulldozers and AVREs of 26 and 80 Assault Squadrons from 5 Assault Regiment RE, 1st Assault Brigade RE. Close armoured support was provided by 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, which provided four squadrons of DD tanks, which were intended to land immediately before the infantry. In the event, sea conditions delayed many of the DD tanks and all the breaching teams right across the Divisional front so that they mostly landed behind the infantry. (NB: some sources claim that flails from the Westminster Dragoons were under command of 22 Dragoons. This is true but only for the follow-up phase on 3rd British Division's front, where two Troops of the Westminsters' A Squadron were earmarked for the projected advance on Caen. See XXII Dragoons history, p. 174.) Additional gunfire support came from 3 and 4 Batteries, 2 Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment (95mm Centaurs).
The initial assault objective was to take out the six key German beach strongpoints on Juno. Establishing a beach-head about a mile deep, the forward line code-named 'Yew', was the next task. There would then be an advance to an intermediate line, 'Elm', with the final objective for D Day being the Caen-Bayeux Road, 'Oak', a very optimistic 10 miles inland.
The beach strongpoints were the forward defences of II Battalion 736 Grenadier Regiment, 716 Coastal Defence Division of LXXXIV Korps. They and the immediately supporting field defences were manned by around three companies, with HQ and one company in reserve behind Bernieres and the 441 Ost Battalion supporting an anti-tank screen behind Courseulles. II Battalion 726 Grenadier Regiment was behind them again, manning a recent but incomplete inland resistance line.
The Canadian H-Hour was 0735 for the western beaches and 0745 for the eastern. This was 20 to 30 minutes later than the flanking divisions because they had to wait for the tide to provide deeper water to cross some off-shore reefs. Sea conditions on the approach made the actual landings even later.
The Division attacked with two Brigades forward. 7 Brigade was on the right (west), going in against Courseulles, the strongest sector of the invasion front, and straddling the port and mouth of the Seulles River. Their three beaches were Mike Green and Red, and Nan Green, the latter directly opposite Courseulles. 8 Brigade was on the left (east), going in over Nan White and Red beaches opposite Bernieres and St. Aubin. For the landing they had under command British 48 RM Commando, tasked to capture Langrune sur Mer on the extreme left flank and to make contact with the British 3 Division. Each brigade attacked with two battalions forward and one in reserve, each battalion with two companies in the first wave, two in the immediate follow-up role.
Despite the tremendous fire-power directed at the beach defences, most of them appeared largely untouched and each one had to be fought for by the leading infantry companies. In 7 Brigade's sector the far right flank objectives were taken without too much trouble but the main Courseulles strongpoint took a heavy toll. On the Brigade's left, the DD tanks arrived well in advance of the infantry on Nan Green beach, which greatly helped in securing the objectives. In 8 Brigade's sector, the left Nan Red beach at St. Aubin was particularly difficult and even with armoured support took over four hours to secure. The follow-on companies of both assault battalions landed at around 0830. The reserve 9 Brigade began to land through Bernieres around 1140 but was delayed on the beach by congestion. The Divisional commander, General Keller, and his tactical HQ landed around noon and he had his first command conference at 1430 in Bernieres. By the evening the Division was well short of its final D Day objective but had secured most of the intermediate line and beyond in some places. Casualties were lighter than expected overall, 340 dead, 574 wounded, 47 missing.
The next day, 7 June, 7 Brigade on the right continued its advance to the D Day objective line and took Putot en Bessin, Bretville l'Orgueilleuse and Norrey en Bessin. On the left, 8 Brigade failed to capture the radar station at Douvres, a heavily fortified structure, largely underground, and the responsibility was passed to the British 51 (Highland) Division, the follow-up formation. Also on the left but to the south, 9 Brigade had suffered from sharp local counter-attacks during the night but took up the advance in the morning. By 1300, they were nearly on the line of the final D Day objective and overlooking Carpiquet. Further progress was stopped by heavy fire from the east and a withdrawal was ordered. Before this could be fully effected, severe casualties were suffered in a heavy attack from Kurt Meyer's 25 SS Pz. Gren. Rgt. (III Bn.), supported by Mk.IV tanks from 12 SS Pz. Rgt., all from the recently arrived 12 SS Pz. Div. It was following these fierce engagements that the first murders of Canadian prisoners were committed by 12 SS troops.
On the morning of 8 June a similar heavy attack was launched against 7 Canadian Brigade on the right, this time from 26 Pz. Gren. Rgt., 12 SS Pz. Div. Norrey was held and Putot initially lost, but re-taken in the evening. Once again, Canadian prisoners, mostly Winnipegs, were murdered by elements of 12 SS. A further attempt to dislodge Canadian 7 Brigade was made on the night of 8 –9 June with the main effort, supported by 12 SS Pz. Rgt's. Panther Battalion, directed against Bretville. The attack was beaten off with heavy casualties on both sides and the Germans withdrew at dawn on 9 June.
On 11 June 46 RM Commando under command of 8 Brigade secured the villages of Cairon, Rots and Le Hamel on the left but on the same day the Queens Own Rifles of Canada and 1 Hussars were repulsed with severe casualties in a hasty attack on Le Mesnil Patry.
The bridgehead secured, the Division held its positions until ordered to take Carpiquet village and airfield in Operation Windsor on 4 July. The task was given to 8 Brigade. There was massive support from Army and naval artillery, pre-arranged and on-call air support, and attachments of flail, AVRE and Crocodile flamethrower specialised armour. On the left Carpiquet village and some airfield hangers were taken but the attack on hangers to the south of the airfield was beaten back with heavy casualties, making the final phase of capturing the airfield control buildings impossible. The opposition was the same 12 SS Pz. Div., with Kurt Meyer now commanding.
Operation Charnwood followed on 8 –9 July, aimed at the capture of Caen up to the west bank of the Orne River. The operation involved three divisions, very large artillery concentrations and heavy bombers to attack the city's southern outskirts. 3 Canadian Division was on the right with 9 Brigade attacking southwards to take Gruchy, Buron and Authie. 7 Brigade passed through in the early evening and attacked east to Cussy and the Ardenne Abbey. The following day 9 Brigade attacked into the south western suburbs. 8 Brigade also attacked on this day, finally taking Carpiquet airfield and exploiting to Bretville sur Odon. Casualties were again heavy, 3 Canadian Division recording some 1200 for the two days.
On 11 July the Division came under command of the newly activated 2 Canadian Corps. On 18 July, the Division took part in Operation Atlantic, on the right flank of the British armoured thrust, Operation Goodwood. The Division attacked out of the airborne bridgehead southwards down the east bank of the Orne. 8 Brigade were held up at the chateau outside Colombelles and at the steel works further on but Giberville to the east was taken. 9 Brigade pushed through the congestion into the eastern end of Vaucelles by evening. 7 Brigade managed to get from Caen into southern Vaucelles in the late afternoon. On the morning of 19 July Vaucelles was cleared and by early afternoon the industrial suburb of Cormelles had fallen to a combination of 9 and 7 Brigade units.
Operation Spring on 25 July was aimed at the Verrieres ridge to open the way to Falaise. The attack was a failure. 3 Division was directed on Tilly la Campagne and then Garcelles. 9 Brigade attacked from Bourguebus in the early hours but was repulsed with heavy losses. Their opponents here were 1 SS Pz. Div.
In the early hours of 31 July, the Division was relieved by 4 Canadian Armoured Division and withdrew to Colomby-sur-Thaon for a short rest after 55 days continuously in the line.
Operation Totalize was an innovative plan using, in the first phase, eight closely packed parallel armoured columns, including the first armoured personnel carriers improvised from redundant SP field gun mounts, attacking at night across ground prepared by heavy bombing, to open the way to Falaise. The attack began late on the night of 7 August, 3 Division to go forward the following day in the second phase. As it closed up to its start line it was bombed by our own aircraft, the GOC being one of the casualties. The Division was committed at the forward point of the penetration on 10 August, when 8 Brigade suffered heavy casualties in a failed attack on Quesnay Wood before the operation was closed down.
Operation Tractable was essentially a re-run of Totalize, but in daylight, again aimed towards Falaise. The attack began just before noon on 14 August, the Division being on the right and directed south east across the Laison valley and river to Montboint and then south towards the high ground north of Falaise. Initial success was exploited in the following days as the Allies fought to close the 'Falaise Gap'. On 18 August the Division was ordered to hold the east bank of the Dives southwards to Trun and Magny and the 'gap' was finally closed on 21 August.
The Division moved east on 23rd August, directed to the Seine, which they reached about Elbeuf on 26th. They crossed the following day and on 30 August sent patrols into the eastern side of Rouen. From there they advanced to the Channel coast at Le Treport, thence across the Somme at Abbeville, reaching the outer defences of Boulogne by 5 September. There was a delay until specialist resources were released from the attack on Le Havre but on 17 September Operation Wellhit was launched against Boulogne, using 8 and 9 Brigades. It took hard fighting until 22nd September to capture the town and adjacent batteries.
3 Division was also made responsible for the capture of Calais, reached by the Division's reconnaissance regiment on 5 September, 7 Brigade arriving the following day. The launch of the main attack, Operation Undergo, was delayed until 25 September, again waiting for specialist resources plus the infantry of 8 Brigade to become available. The port and surrounding batteries were captured by the morning of 1 October.
The Division was next committed to a particularly arduous task, clearing the south bank of the Scheldte estuary, the area known as the 'Beskens Pocket'. The Division moved 90 miles north and on 6 October 7 Brigade launched an attack into the southern flank of the German position across the Leopold Canal south of Aardenburg. This failed in the face of fierce resistance. On 9 October 9 Brigade launched a successful amphibious attack across the Braakman inlet into the north east corner of the German position, Operation Switchback. 8 Brigade followed through on 11 –12 October and extended the bridgehead. The pocket was finally reduced on 2 November.
Operation Veritable and its follow-on, Blockbuster, aimed to clear the Rhineland eastwards from Nijmegen prior to an assault over the Rhine. The Division initially came under command of British 30 Corps, itself under Canadian 1 Army. The attack began on 8 February 1945, the Division advancing at 1800 on the northern flank, tasked to clear the Waal Flats, the flooded area between the Nijmegen –Cleve road and the Rhine. 7 and 8 Brigades undertook the initial advance, carried in Buffalo amphibious personnel carriers of 79 Armoured Division, 9 Brigade similarly mounted passing through at 1630 on 10th. By 14 February the Division was beyond its original target, on a line Cleve –Emmerich. The following day the Division reverted to 2 Canadian Corps and took over 15 Scottish Division's front with a view to opening the approach to Calcar. 7 Brigade took Louisendorf and reached the Goch –Calcar road by 17 February but it took until 21 February to clear Moyland wood on the left flank.
Operation Blockbuster was the renewed effort to clear the Rhineland and opened on the morning of 26 February. The Division's 8 Brigade had achieved its task of capturing Keppeln and the surrounding area by late afternoon. 9 Brigade then passed through and captured Udem by early morning of 27th.
By 1 March the Division had shifted forward and was operating around the 'Hochwald Gap'. It took 8 Brigade from 1 to 4 March to get through the Tuschen Wald and the Balberger Wald. On 6 March Sonnsbeck fell, which effectively ended the battle for the Division.
On 20 March, 9 Brigade passed to command of 51 Highland Division and the balance of 3 Division came under 30 Corps in preparation for the Rhine crossing, Operation Plunder. The assault began on the evening of 23 March. The lead elements of 9 Brigade crossed into the left of the bridgehead in early morning of 24 March from where they attacked Speldrop, securing the place the following morning. The remainder of the Brigade entered the bridgehead on the afternoon of 24th where they had to fight for two days to extend their part of the Bridgehead north. The Division was complete in the bridgehead by 28 March. The Division next swung west and 7 Brigade attacked Emmerich on the night of 27 –28 March, completed on 31st. 8 Brigade passed through on the night of 30 –31 March and by 1 April had taken the wooded Hoch Elten ridge north west of Emmerich, 9 Brigade having simultaneously taken the Stokkummer Bosch to the north.
The Division pushed north along the east bank of the Ijssel River and was next tasked to capture Zutphen. Between 5 and 8 April the town and the western end of the Twente Canal to its east were cleared. 9 Brigade was detached to help the push north and 7 Brigade closed up to Deventer, which it attacked on 10th, the town being cleared the following day in what proved to be the last determined resistance met by the Division.
Starting on 10 April, 9 Brigade led a rapid advance north, meeting the Royal Canadian Dragoons in Leeuwarden, 70 miles north of Deventer, on the afternoon of 15th April. They reached the North Sea –Ijsselmeer coast by 18 April.
The Division displaced east, first to positions opposite Delfzijl and then further east again to the area around the small port of Leer at the mouth of the Leda and Ems Rivers. The Division attacked Leer over the Leda River in Operation Duck on the afternoon of 28 April and had secured the town by the end of the following day. The Division was exploiting north towards Emden and Aurich when the ceasefire was announced on 4 May.
The Division regrouped around Amersfoort in early June 1945 for repatriation of troops. The Divisional HQ was eventually disbanded on 23 November 1945.
A 3rd Division, Canadian Army Occupation Force, was raised in the Amersfoort area around June 1945, with its constituent components affiliated to the original Division but manned primarily by reinforcement personnel from the UK.
For additional details of the CAOF see INS 34.
Inscription
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