INTERVIEW WITH BRIGADIER ED BUTLER, 28 SEPTEMBER 2006 [Allocated Title]

Brigadier Ed Butler, CO of 16 Air Assault Brigade in Afghanistan, is interviewed.

Mini-DV

Brigadier Ed Butler, Commanding Officer of 16 Air Assault Brigade is interviewed in September 2006 about the difficulties faced in Helmand and the importance of air support.

I think we were all naïve that you would be able to advance all lines of operation, security, the development reconstruction all simultaneously. We were very clear from the start that we were going to have to have a fight and we were going to have to knock over a significant number of Taliban and the break in battle that we have only just achieved at the six month point, that has led to some frustrations within the other government departments who anticipated that they would be able to advance at the same level as us. What's happened is the security line of operation has accelerated away; we've got to establish a secure situation which we have, we are pretty well there in terms of the break in battle, then it's the follow on phases which come in behind that. So that's taking some time to explain and the frustrations both institutional and personal have been evident. There is a very strong bond and trust been generated and sustained between the RAF helicopter pilots in particular the RAF attack helicopter pilots, the Harrier force. I have never witnessed it as strong as it has been here. They have dug them out of trouble we have had helicopter pilots flying into hot LSs [landing sites] , pulling out wounded people, inserting forces onto very tight LS [landing site] under fire had a number of helicopters hit we have had RPGs over and above helicopters but the fact that the blokes on the ground know that the pilots will come and pull them out of trouble time and time again and put them back in if they need to reinforce it has been staggering. (11.27-12.24, 30.08-30.58)

Brigadier Ed Butler, Commanding Officer of 16 Air Assault Brigade, describes tensions between the military and civilian development officials during 2006.

They have very different understandings of risk threshold; the risk threshold of the military is very high that is what we are paid for the risk threshold for DFID [Department for International Development] is very low, FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office) is slightly better, MOD [Ministry of Defence] civil servants is slightly better. If you are trying to say we are going to do a certain operation a visit or a shura [meeting with Afghan elders] you have got those competing thresholds which not only delay but actually get to decision often by consensus rather than by operational necessity the link point of that and we still don't have it is trying to get a common perception of security. It's essential that you can identify demonstrable difference to the Afghan, what he's been after is security, security, and security but he quickly wants to raise his expectations, and it's been a big expectation management game here and and unless you can point to something - it may not fit the long term development goal - but it does buy you security by maintaining consent so that again that's been tensions between different Government departments about how we should be doing development. The overall plan, the Joint UK Plan is sound but what's been a challenge is trying to tacticalising it, the ways and means of getting there and that again has been the cause of some debate. (12.59-13.32, 14.56-15.42)