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The Allied victory over the German U-boats in May 1943 was not
the end of the Battle of the Atlantic, but it was the decisive moment.
Dönitz fulfilled his promise for his submarines to return to
the fray, but never again did they pose as grave a threat. The sea
and air escorts and support groups sent out with the convoys and
the Very Long Range aircraft patrolling in mid-Atlantic were the
keystones of the Allied success and they maintained their predominance
until the end of the war. Also, in July 1943, the rate of production
at which new merchant shipping was coming out of British and American
yards overtook the rate at which U-boats were sinking Allied ships
at sea and never afterwards fell below it.
During July and August, further defeats were inflicted on Dönitz's
forces along U-boat transit routes in the Shetlands-Faroe Islands
gap and across the Bay of Biscay. The offensive in the latter area
proved by far the most successful of the two, where twenty boats
were sunk between 1 July and 2 August. Many were surprised on the
surface at night by aircraft now equipped with both Leigh Lights
and centrimetric radar. Also, American escort carriers destroyed
the "milch cows" refuelling U-boats off the Azores.
The wolf packs returned to the North Atlantic in September 1943
armed with new acoustic homing torpedoes and improved anti-aircraft
radar and weapons. However, attacks on convoys over the autumn achieved
only limited success at the cost of a severe mauling by Allied sea
and air escorts. Forty U-boats were sunk in the North Atlantic in
the last four months of 1943 to add to the twelve lost between June
and August. Wolf pack tactics had finally failed. In early 1944,
Dönitz concentrated on British coastal waters in the north-western
approaches in an attempt to repeat the first "happy time".
Unfortunately for the German Navy, three and a half years on, Allied
anti-submarine firepower was vastly stronger than it had been in
1940. Coastal Command squadrons from western Scotland and Northern
Ireland provided continuous air cover, while at sea several escort
and support groups, some with escort carriers, were concentrated
against the U-boats which suffered another severe defeat.
For the rest of the war, Dönitz's force was reduced to a harassing
role to try and tie down as many Allied naval forces as possible.
A prime opportunity for such action came against the ships and landing
craft massing in the waters of the English Channel and adjacent
coastal areas for the invasion of Europe in June 1944. Most U-boats
had by this time been fitted with the Schnorkel breathing
device, allowing them to stay underwater for much longer periods
than hitherto and making them much harder to detect. However, so
numerous were the escorts and so intensive the air and sea patrolling
accompanying the invasion convoys that few U-boats reached the fleet.
In the remaining months of the war, increasingly successful Allied
bombing of factories and assembly ports, which delayed the completion
of advanced new types, put the seal on the final and utter defeat
of the U-boat.
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