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The Germans got back into
port first and they capitalised heavily on that advantage in the
war of words that followed what they called the 'Battle of Skaggerak'.
From their perspective they had indeed won a great victory. Scheer
initially claimed to have sunk three battlecruisers, one super-dreadnought
(mistakenly claiming the Warspite), two armoured cruisers,
two light cruisers and 13 destroyers. At this point the Germans
cautiously only admitted to the loss of the predreadnought Pommern
and the Wiesbaden, though allowing that the Frauenlob
and some destroyers has not yet returned. They concealed the loss
of the Lutzow, the Elbing and Rostock. As one
the German nation boiled over with excitement and patriotic jubilation.
Banner headlines screamed the news of victory from every street
corner and soon the rest of the world was convinced that the Royal
Navy had been soundly thrashed.
From the other side of the North Sea the perception of what
soon became known as the Battle of Jutland was markedly different.
To Jellicoe, Beatty, the Admiralty, the men of the Royal Navy and
above all the civilian population at large, the Battle of Jutland
was a distinct disappointment. Even before the Grand Fleet had
reached harbour, the first rumours of defeat had begun to
circulate. The Admiralty, conscious that the Germans had already
begun to peddle their version of the battle to the international
press, were keen to issue a statement. Their communiqué showed
all the signs of having been written by committee and it was quite
startlingly frank in revealing the British losses. This was the
first real source of hard information for a country gasping,
palpitating for news. But in its determination to face up to some
unpalatable facts it failed to put any sort of gloss on events.
Crucially, it failed to mention that the Grand Fleet had been left
in control of the seas, or that the Germans, to put it bluntly,
had fled for their lives.
Somewhat belatedly the Admiralty realised that perhaps they had
not employed entirely the right tone in their statement. Bolstered
by further reports from Jellicoe, they tried to correct their
defeatist tone in a second communiqué issued on 3 June. This sought
to boost German losses, followed by a third statement on 4 June,
which grossly exaggerated them. The subsequent German confession
on 7 June that they had concealed the loss of the battlecruiser
Lutzow and light cruiser Rostock in their first statements
also helped to undermine the initial perception of outright German
victory. Gradually the overall international view of the battle
mutated to that of a qualified British success, as it was realised
that the British blockade endured unchallenged.
Any analysis of ships lost and of casualties sustained shows
that the Germans did indeed have a good superficial case for
celebrating a victory. In all, the British lost three
battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers and eight destroyers. The
Germans lost one battlecruiser, one pre-dreadnought, four light
cruisers and five destroyers. In addition some 6,094 British
sailors lost their lives as opposed to 2,551 Germans. Most of the
British casualties had been caused by the explosive detonation of
the three battlecruisers - had the German battlecruisers displayed
an equivalent volatility then the picture would have been very
different.
Yet it remains a fact that the British won the Battle of
Jutland. In the end the material successes of the High Seas Fleet
fade into complete insignificance in comparison to the crushing
strategic success of the British. The great question of the naval
war had been answered. Although the High Sea Fleet would emerge
again, they never again seriously threatened to dispute the
command of the seas with the Grand Fleet. Their sole intention at
Jutland had been to isolate a small portion of the British fleet
and by destroying it allow a fleet action between relative equals
to quickly follow. They had almost succeeded but they had in the
end failed. The British loses were painful, but quickly replaced.
The British margin of superiority was not affected in the
slightest. There is no room for sentiment in war, the most brutal
of sciences. The mere fact of the brave German fight against the
odds does not materially change the result unless the morale of
the Grand Fleet had been destroyed in the process. This was
demonstrably not the case. Although proud of their achievements at
Jutland, the more thoughtful German naval officers clearly
acknowledged the legitimacy of the British strategic victory.
The English fleet, by remaining a 'fleet in being', by its
mere continued existence, had so far fully fulfilled its allotted
task. The Battle of Skagerrak did not relax the pressure exerted
by the English fleet as a 'fleet in being' for one minute.
Commander Georg von Hase, SMS Derfflinger, I Scouting
Group, High Seas Fleet
Scheer understood this only too well. He had no intention of
confronting the full strength of the Grand Fleet ever again and
lost much of his enthusiasm for further surface adventures in the
North Sea. Henceforth he advocated unrestricted submarine warfare
as the naval panacea to the parlous strategic situation that
entwined Germany. The morale of the German High Seas Fleet, which
had briefly blossomed after the perceived German victory at
Jutland, soon leached away as they realised that for them 'Der
Tag' would never dawn. As the war finally staggered to a close two
long painful years later, the High Seas Fleet mutinied rather than
emerge to fight a last futile battle. The ultimate triumph of the
Royal Navy was reflected in the humiliating surrender of the 70
ships of the High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918.
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