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On 24 January, 1916, Admiral Reinhard Scheer
took command of the German High Seas Fleet. Scheer brought a
fresh mind, and a good deal more vigour, to the problem of finding
a real role for his fleet. He recognised that a straight
battle with the British fleet was to be avoided at all costs. He sought to attain
this by trying to provoke the
Admiralty, and Jellicoe, into rash action. This he attempted with
a policy of systematic and constant pressure across the whole
gamut of naval warfare: submarines and mines, tip and run raids,
and attacks on the British convoys to Scandinavia. He meant to
capitalise on the confusion brought about by swift single actions
in order to attain a temporary local
superiority. This approach, if vigorously exploited, could erode the ever-increasing
naval superiority of the British.
Scheer planned to make the fullest possible
use of the submarines released by the suspension of the
short-lived unrestricted submarine campaign. The German battlecruisers
under the command of Hipper would bombard the British town of Sunderland.
Scheer anticipated that Beatty would rush down with his Battlecruiser Fleet. German submarines, some of them
minelayers, would lie in wait across the exits from Rosyth and
Scapa Flow ready to do their worst when the fleets emerged. Hipper
would then engage Beatty, and draw him inexorably to his doom at
the hands of Scheer and the High Seas Fleet, who would be lurking in the Dogger
Bank area. Air reconnaissance by zeppelin would ensure that they were not themselves
ambushed by superior forces. But Scheer's plans were fatally flawed.
The Germans had still not realised that their signals were being
intercepted and swiftly decoded by the British. The success of the
information coming from Room 40 can be judged by the
fact that Jellicoe and Beatty were at sea before 23.00 on 30 May.
Scheer did not even leave harbour until 02.30 the following morning.
Back in London, Room 40 received a fateful
visit from the Director of Naval Operations, Captain Thomas Jackson.
Jackson had no respect for their acquired expertise and brusquely
asked where the wireless directional stations had placed Scheer's
wireless call sign 'DK'. He received the answer, 'In the Jade [Wilhelmshaven]'
and asked no more questions. This was extremely unfortunate, for
'DK' was Scheer's harbour call sign; when at sea he transferred
this call sign to a harbour station and changed to another one. This simple ruse was known
to Room 40 staff, but Jackson stalked off and reported that Scheer
was still in harbour.
Scheer, of course, was at sea. A light cruiser screen
was sailing ahead, followed by the battlecruisers under
Admiral Hipper. Fifty miles behind came the High Seas Fleet itself.
The scene was set for battle on 31 May.
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