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When war broke out in 1914, the British
public, and no small proportion of the Royal Navy, expected that there
would be a huge sea battle to resolve the command of the seas.
The German High Seas Fleet, however, declined to
nobly sacrifice
itself. Its overall approach was to try to substantially
reduce the British Grand Fleet by attrition through the use of mines and torpedoes.
Until such time as this could be achieved, the German High Seas Fleet stayed in harbour.
Admiral
John Jellicoe, the Commander in Chief of the British Grand Fleet, was determined
not to take unnecessary risks to try and secure a victory.
The British Empire could not withstand a serious defeat at sea,
nor indeed, could the Allies. His main preoccupation was to avoid
weakening the fleet by running into some kind of destroyer, submarine
or mine trap.
The Grand Fleet therefore adopted a policy of distant
blockade which was almost thrust upon them by the circumstances
of geography. The British Isles effectively blockaded
the Germans, as it lay four-square across the sea routes to
Germany. The main British fleet would be concentrated in the huge
natural harbour of Scapa Flow, tucked away in the Orkneys: from
here they could sweep down as required into the North Sea if the
German High Seas Fleet should dare to emerge. The
Battlecruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty was based at Rosyth
in the Forth estuary. This arrangement was aided by the
accurate intelligence of German movements provided by 'Room 40'.
Founded by Sir William Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence and
headed by Sir James Ewing, Room 40 was made up of a
group of decoding experts who worked on breaking German naval
codes during the course of the war.
The 'distant blockade' policy ceded absolute
control of
the North Sea, but it did secure for Great Britain almost all the
benefits of control of the wider oceans across the globe. The
German High Seas Fleet was effectively under house arrest.
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