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Jellicoe knew the High Seas Fleet was effectively
trapped out to the west of the Grand Fleet. The risks of a night
action were to be avoided if possible the question was, which
course to steer?
The Germans had two main options of escape.
The first was the Horns Reef route, north of the huge British
minefields that almost filled the Heligoland Bight. This offered
Scheer the quickest straightest route to safety around 100 miles
but it was also a haunt of patrolling British submarines. The
second option lay via the north Frisian coast, past the mouth
of the Ems, which lay about 180 miles away. It was this that Jellicoe
considered the most likely, based on Scheer's last reported position
and course. His dreadnoughts had the speed to prevent Scheer passing
in front of him and heading for Ems, while he believed that his massed
destroyer flotillas could prevent him sneaking astern the fleet
heading for sanctuary of the Horns Reef channel. At 21.01 Jellicoe
ordered the battle line into their close formation, night cruising
order and the destroyers flotillas were sent to guard the rear.
Even before Jellicoe had ordered his positions,
Scheer had planned his escape route. Given the condition of several
of his most valuable ships, he was going to take the shortest
route, straight for Horns Reef. There was to be no diversion,
the only real chance of survival was to press on regardless. Speed
was of the essence both to capitalise on the natural surprise
of night encounters but also to prevent the British having any
time to react effectively to what was going on around them. It
was a bold decision, he was risking everything, but at least
the goal was clear - however he might bluster after the event
escape was the only priority.
As the British light forces took up their
positions, the High Seas Fleet was already inexorably moving towards
down the one side of a 'V'. At first the British barely noticed
they were under threat. A myriad of small scale but increasingly
deadly actions then followed. Dark shapes appeared out of the
night, anxious commanders pondered who they were and torrents
of fire burst upon those unwise enough to ask for identification
signals. The British lacked proper shuttered searchlight control,
star shells and night fighting training. Many of their actions had a defensive character which
did little to actually bar the passage of the German fleet. They
conspicuously failed to launch co-ordinated mass torpedo attacks.
Many officers did not understand what was going on; they wanted
to leave the decision making as far as possible to someone else.
They did not want to make a mistake and would rather do nothing, rather than risk their reputations.
Most simply ignored the fighting around them and left it to others
to bear the brunt of the actions. Not one of them had the time
or presence or mind to wireless in contact reports to Jellicoe.
They had held the future of the High Seas Fleet within their grasp,
but it had slipped through their fingers. For all their efforts
they had achieved little of significance.
During all the excitement the Seydlitz
and the Moltke (who become separated first from the rest
of the High Seas Fleet) had begun their efforts to pass through
the British in, in order to escape to safety. They too were sighted time
and time again but were left to pass unscathed through the British
fleet. Officers did not dare to open fire in case it revealed
their position.
Room 40 had intercepted and successfully
decoded several of Scheer's wireless messages that together made
it clear that he was heading for Horns Reef. This was the key
to victory of the 1st June. But Jellicoe had developed an active
distrust of intelligence sent to him from the Admiralty. The fateful
blunder that had seen the Admiralty inform him that the High Seas
Fleet was still in harbour still rankled. Why then did Jellicoe
not recognise that the sights and sounds of battle behind him
marked the course of the High Seas Fleet as it battered its way
across the rear of his fleet, exactly as had been forewarned in
the Admiralty signal? Surely his distrust of Admiralty intelligence
could have been tempered by the evidence before his eyes?
Here
Jellicoe cannot entirely escape the blame: although he was not given the
whole of the information available to the Admiralty and his subordinates
let him down in not providing situation reports, he did
nothing to find out exactly what was going on behind him. No signals
were made to the destroyer flotillas enquiring as to whom they
were engaging and in what circumstances. Here perhaps Jellicoe's
age stood against him: at 58 he stood on the cusp of old age.
He must have been suffering from the mental after effects of a
whole day of momentous decisions based on minimal information,
under conditions of considerable discomfort, in physical danger
and without any chance for real rest and recuperation. As is ever
the case with real warfare, there was no such time for relaxed
contemplation of the problem. With hindsight it is reasonably
easy to work out what was happening, but for the men that were
there it was a deadly guessing game.
Thus the barrier placed by Jellicoe across
Scheer's line of retreat to Horns Reef was dispersed, and the
long line of German dreadnoughts and wounded battlecruisers succeeded
in breaking right through the rear of the Grand Fleet without
losing a single major ship.
The last attack was launched by the 12th
Flotilla under Captain Stirling. He had a little more confidence
than most. As he became aware of a line of big ships ahead of
him, Stirling eyed up the situation. Although he could not identify
them he was sure they were not British. Acting upon his convictions
he ordered his ships to attack.
The Onslaught, captained by Captain
Onslow, was the last in the attacking line. Aboard was a very
young seaman, George Wainford.
"Fire!" So we fired our torpedoes and
of course other ships in the flotilla did the same and there was
a terrific explosion and a German ship blew up. "Cor!" I said,
" We got her!" And the moment I said that either one shell or
a salvo hit our bridge. George Wainford, HMS Onslaught
Listen to George Wainford (Ref: 9953) - .wav
| .mp3
The flotillas torpedoes caused chaos in
the German line but only two torpedoes struck home, scoring hits
on the pre-dreadnought Pommern, which blew up in a devastating
explosion killing all 844 members of her crew. Aboard the Onslaught,
the bridge and forward area took the brunt of the damage. Sub
Lieutenant Harry Kemmis was forced to take command.
Shell burst against the port side of
the charthouse and forebridge igniting a box of cordite, causing
a fire in the charthouse, completely wrecking the forebridge and
destroying nearly all navigational instruments, At the time there
were on the forebridge: the captain, first lieutenant, torpedo
coxswain two quartermasters and both signalmen, and the gunner
on his way up the bridge ladder. I had just been sent down to
tell the engine room to make black smoke, in order to screen our
movements, and had only got to the bottom of the ladder from the
forecastle deck to the upper deck. I went back to the bridge and,
finding everything wrecked, the captain mortally wounded and the
First Lieutenant killed, I assumed command. Sub Lieutenant
Harry Kemmis, HMS Onslaught.
Wainford and Kemmis came into contact.
We could hear a lot of crying and talking
and shouting on the foc'sle end so I went to go up there. Sub-Lieutenant
Kemmis was there, he said, "Where are you going, Wainford?" I
said, "On the foc'sle, Sir, to help!" He said, "Keep down below
out of it, find something else to do!" I thought, "I wonder why
he said that?" I found out later the forr'ard 4" gun had had in
a direct hit, they were all killed an injured. The commanding
officer was killed, the first lieutenant was killed, the warrant
officer was killed that was the three officers. I think the
coxswain at the wheel was killed and there were several more wounded.
It was a bit of a shambles really. I saw one chap, it was horrible,
his whole stomach was torn open, it was all hanging out and he
was trying to push it back and that's why I was told to keep
out of it. Sub-Lieutenant Kemmis said, "Get down below and send
a senior hand up here!" George Wainford, HMS Onslaught
Listen to George Wainford (Ref: 9953) - .wav
| .mp3
Osnlow was taken below decks, where young
Wainford witnessed his final moments and his unbearably poignant
last words.
The skipper died in the crew's foc'sle,
on the mess table. They laid him on there. I'll always remember
his last words, he said, "Is the ship all right? I said, "Yes,
Sir, the ship's all right!" He said, "I'll have a little sleep
now then
." And that was it. I was there when he died. George
Wainford, HMS Onslaught
Listen to George Wainford (Ref: 9953) - .wav
| .mp3
The battle was almost over. The Lutzow
sank on her way back. The Seydlitz survived but had been
hit by 21 heavy shells and one torpedo, with 98 men killed and
55 injured. But the bulk of the High Seas Fleet was safe home.
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