Lightfoot start line: Armour at El Alamein

Andrew Colquhoun, Assistant Librarian, IWM

Ground Orientation

Andrew Colquhoun

We are on the start line for operation Lightfoot, at the junction between the positions of the 51st Highland Division on our left and the 9th Australian Division on our right. This ground was the position of the northern corridor for the advance of the tanks of 10th Armoured Corps. The plan called for 1st Armoured Division to advance here along the northern corridor, and 10th Armoured Division to advance along the southern corridor through the positions of the New Zealanders on the Miteiriya Ridge. Here on the northern corridor, 2nd Armoured Brigade consisting of 168 tanks, some 3,000 vehicles in all, was to advance from the Springbok track, approximately 6 miles behind us, to the British minefield here, and on to break through the enemy minefield and deploy on the Pierson bound approximately 41/2 miles in the distance, just beyond the infantry objective, the Oxalic line. The plan very clearly envisaged that the armour should break through the enemy defensive positions to deploy into open country beyond.

Introduction

El Alamein Museum

Eighth Army had 1,029 operational tanks on 23 October 1942¹. By contrast, the Germans had 218 fit tanks, of which 173 were Mark IIIs and 38 Mark IVs². In addition, there were 278 medium tanks³ available to the Italians; these have been variously described as obsolete and death traps.

Eighth Army had 252 Sherman tanks newly arrived from America. Armed with a dual-purpose 75mm turret-mounted main weapon, they could match anything encountered in the desert thus far. In addition, there were 170 of the American-made Grants, whose 75mm gun had proved effective, but suffered from being mounted in the hull, requiring the whole tank to be turned to aim it. Its high silhouette made it vulnerable, even in hull-down positions.

Of the remaining British models, the Crusader, even the newly arrived 6pdr. Mk. 3 version, proved to be unreliable, under-gunned, and poorly armoured. It was no match for enemy tanks or anti-tank guns. Stuart tanks were light, fast, reliable, and useful for reconnaissance, but on the whole were under-gunned. The Valentines proved reliable, but their 2pdr. armament was wholly inadequate.

10th Corps

Montgomery envisaged 10th Corps as an Eighth Army equivalent of the Deutsche Afrika Korps. Its two Armoured Divisions, the 1st and 10th equipped with 92 and 124 Sherman tanks respectively, out of a total of 449 tanks in the Corps, represented the armoured striking power of the Eighth Army. 10th Corps had twice the armoured strength of the Deutsche Afrika Korps on 23rd October 1942.

I will concentrate on the operations of 10th Corps, and 2nd Armoured Brigade in particular.

Operation Lightfoot

In principle, the armoured plan for Lightfoot was for 7th Armoured Division to mount a subsidiary attack in the south, whilst the main armoured thrust took place in the north on the 30th Corps front. The infantry divisions of 30th Corps, supported by Valentines of 23rd Armoured Brigade, were to break into the enemy's defensive positions to create a bridgehead on the Oxalic objective and then to undertake crumbling operations to the north and south to widen the bridgehead. 10th Corps' armour was to pass through the infantry's positions along two corridors-in the north between the positions of the 9th Australian Division and the 51st Highland Division, and in the south running through the New Zealanders positions. 10th Corp's armour was to move off from the Sprinbok track, 6 miles behind the start line, to pass through gaps cleared in the British and German minefields, pass through the infantry positions and deploy to the Pierson bound, and from there to destroy the enemy armour on ground of its own choosing. The Deutsche Afrika Korps would be forced into counter-attacking the infantry's crumbling operations.

2nd Armoured Brigade

Along the northern corridor, 2nd Armoured Brigade was to move forward along the Sun, Moon, and Star tracks to be cleared through the minefields. From right to left, the Queen's Bays were allotted Sun, 9th Lancers Moon, and 3rd Hussars Star. Laurie Milner described the work of the mine-clearing parties yesterday. Along 2nd Armoured Brigade's corridor, 7th Motor Brigade provided not only mine-clearing parties to clear a path forward through the enemy minefields, but these were backed by infantry to subdue enemy strong points missed by the initial assault.

General Briggs describes the drive forward thus:

"The order to move was given and at 3mph with many unavoidable faults the three long columns move [sic] on their respective tracks. The tanks had to follow, kicking up great clouds of fine white dust which obscured everything, including the one in front. It was a nightmare for the tank driver."⁴

The first enemy minefield was reached at 4.00am. It had not been cleared, the work of the mine clearance parties having been seriously hampered by machine gun and small arms fire from enemy strong points that had not been subdued. The infantry of 7th Motor Brigade were unable to get forward to assist, because they were still stuck on the Springbok track in the chaos of traffic at dawn.

As dawn broke, the first shells came over at 6.45am from the enemy guns on a slight rise 3,000 yards away. All three regiments attempted to deploy but were hampered by scattered mines. The dual purpose gun of the Sherman tank proved highly effective in engaging the enemy anti-tank guns. At 8.30am 2nd Armoured Brigade took hull-down positions to engage the first enemy tanks to appear.

The failure to get the armour out before dawn was to prove crucial; Michael Carver's famous description of the first night's armoured attack is very apt:

"Dispersion as far as it was possible at all was a hazardous business, as mines were by no means confined to regular fields and slit trenches abounded. The congestion was appalling and the confusion considerable. The whole area looked like a badly organised car park at an immense race meeting held in a dust bowl."⁵

Why Did the Armour Fail to Break Through?

El Alamein Museum

The depth and complexity of the enemy minefields were such that it was impossible to clear them in the time allotted to the task. The timetable was just too tight. Clearing a minefield in an exercise with bayonets and with men trying to concentrate using a detector is difficult enough, but the problems were compounded by shells and mortar bombs crashing down, and machine gun and small arms fire posing a constant threat. Many enemy positions took time to subdue, as the infantry had been unable to clear a path all the way through.

The armour had been ordered to break its own way through if necessary; clearly this was not going to be easy. Enemy anti-tank guns cannot just be rushed in broad daylight; what is required is a coordinated attack using tanks, infantry, and concentrated artillery. Herbert Lumsden, commander of 10th Corps, had warned his armoured commanders on no account to:

"rush blindly on to the enemy's anti-tank guns or try to pass through a narrow bottleneck which is covered by a concentration of enemy tanks".⁶

In such cases "a proper plan was to be made".

Lumsden was heavily criticised for the performance of the 10th Corps armour in operation Lightfoot. Monty severely reproached him over the stalled attack of 8th Armoured Brigade on the night of 24th/25th October, when an enemy air attack caught the Brigade on its start line. Perhaps with their bitter previous experience of the performance of the British armour in mind, the Dominion commanders were highly critical.

The power of anti-tank artillery to dominate the battlefield caused real fear among tank crews. The German 50mm PAK gun had a very low profile and excellent stopping power. The captured Soviet 76.2mm guns could destroy British tanks at over 2,000 yards, whilst the 88mm was an immensely powerful weapon with a reputation well beyond the numbers deployed.

At Alam Halfa Montgomery used deep minefields to stall the Axis armour; if the veterans of the Deutsche Afrika Korps couldn't break through, how could he be so confident that 10th Corps could fare any better?

Much has been made of the dominance of the German anti-tank weapons. The action at Snipe shows that the German armour was just as vulnerable; indeed, the 6 pdr. was a much less powerful weapon than the 88mm, or 76.2mm guns used by the Germans. The 6pdr. guns at the Snipe position accounted for 37 enemy armoured fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns destroyed, with a further 15 to 20 knocked out and later recovered.⁷

Indeed, it was Rommel himself who wrote:

"There is, in general, little chance of success in a tank attack over country where the enemy has been able to take up defensive positions."⁸

Footnotes:
¹ Lucas-Phillips, C.E., Alamein, London, 1962, p. 350.
² Ibid., p. 357.
³ Ibid., p. 358.
⁴ Major-General Raymond Briggs' papers, 99/1/1, IWM.
⁵ El Alamein, M. Carver, London, Batsford, 1962, pp. 110-111.
⁶ The Mediterranean and the Middle East, as before, pp. 34-35.
⁷ Account of the action by 2RB at "SNIPE" on 26/27 Oct 1942, Major-General Raymond Briggs' papers, 99/1/1, IWM.
⁸ The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, London, Collins, 1953, p. 310.