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Sidi Abd el Rahman: Rommel
Lee Wolstenholme, Interactor, IWM
His Views On Commanding In Battle, And His Relationships With Allies, Adversaries, His Superiors... And The Fuhrer
Introduction – The Legend
"There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a ... bogeyman to our troops... He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able... I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general... we must refer to 'the Germans' or 'the Axis powers' or 'the enemy' and not keep harping on Rommel." Such was the unprecedented statement issued by the British, Commonwealth and Allied Army Commander General Auchinleck to his officers in North Africa during the summer of 1942. At the same time, Winston Churchill was bemoaning the British obsession with beating Rommel, and by the end of the summer the new British Commander, General Montgomery, had to take stringent measures to boost the morale of his troops and convince them that it was possible to "hit Rommel for six out of Africa." Despite his order of 1942, General Auchinleck later admitted that "an enemy commander does not gain a reputation of this sort unless he is out of the ordinary and Rommel was certainly exceptional." In this presentation, I'd like to explore some of these "exceptional" aspects of Rommel's character and look at their impact both on the Desert conflict and on the Second World War in general.
Instinct, Experience, Theory.
(a) "I sniff through the country like a fox," said Rommel, referring to his instinctive "feel" for new terrain and his opponents' weaknesses. In North Africa, between February 1941 and March 1943, his opportunism and daring earned him the nickname 'Desert Fox.'
Like many commanders in the Second World War (for example, Gott and Montgomery) Erwin Rommel was influenced by his experiences as a junior officer in the First War. He'd achieved the rank of Lieutenant fairly quickly at the age of 23 and was already showing signs of the style and technique he'd later be famous for.
The frustration of trench warfare, the needless sacrifice of so many men and the inability of either side to capitalise on any advance or breakthrough affected him. In fact, in attempting to break the stalemate, he became renowned for his dashing bravery, leading his infantrymen on commando-style raids into enemy territory. It won him the Iron Cross on the Western Front in 1915 and the "Pour le Mérite" during the 1917 campaign in Northern Italy. The latter was the highest award for gallantry in the German Army and normally reserved for senior officers. By this time he'd been promoted to Captain and had declared that he already knew how to command an army. The award suggests that his superiors thought so too.
(b) There were already examples of his military opportunism and willingness to ignore the instructions of his senior officers. In 1917, during the action on Mount Matajur in Italy, his superior, Major Prosser, ordered him to withdraw from a forward position having concluded that all objectives had been achieved. Rommel ignored him and deployed a mere 100 riflemen and 6 machine-guns against the whole 2nd Battalion of the Salerno Brigade. The offensive succeeded and he captured 1200 prisoners. His instinct, that the enemy were low in morale, unprepared for an attack and unsure of the German numbers, proved spot on. His opinion, that a subordinate who is in the front line and has possession of all the facts should be able to overrule a commanding officer that is not in a position to understand the situation, gave him the courage of his convictions.
(c) By contrast, his first failure in battle came in the very next engagement after Mount Matajur. Once again, his machine-gunners opened the battle brilliantly but this time the infantry didn't pursue their follow-up assault quickly enough. They had been waiting for Rommel himself to come forward and lead them. He'd stayed at the rear with the machine-gun crews. Again, the effects of Rommel's post-battle analysis stayed with him throughout his career. He would always be at the front, ready to lead his men at exactly the right moment. He would never let numerical disadvantage be the sole reason for not seizing the initiative.
(d) In the Kaiser's Germany, where militarism was fashionable, debates in the Military Establishment about the necessary attributes for leadership centred around the importance of breeding and character compared with schooling, theory and the need to gain experience. Rommel confounded all theories and his healthy disregard for the Establishment possibly came in part from listening to such debates. Liddell Hart, in "The Rommel Papers," described Rommel's genius as combining the conceptive and the executive talents. He took schooling seriously, devoured all kinds of literature about warfare and became a great military philosopher as well as man of action. Interesting, then, that between the Wars, he was never given a place at the elitist German War Academy (though he was later to teach there!) or invited onto the General Staff.
The Italian Job (Or, "You Were Only Supposed To Stop The British From Bloody Well Reaching Tripoli"). [Apologies to Michael Caine]
a) When Rommel arrived in North Africa in February 1941, it wasn't a simple case of the cavalry coming to the rescue. For one thing, he was under the command of Italian generals and ultimately Mussolini himself. It is true that the Italians had almost been driven out of Africa completely by the British and Commonwealth forces under General O'Connor and desperately needed German assistance. But so far, Mussolini had been fighting a "parallel war." He hadn't told Hitler that he was going to invade Greece, or even about his actual declaration of war against the Allies. When Hitler had offered Il Duce the use of 3rd Panzer Division against General O'Connor towards the end of 1940 it had been politely declined. Adventures in North Africa were part of Mussolini's dream of building a new Roman Empire and he wished to keep the Germans out if possible. Rommel was welcomed in desperation and instantly put in a delicate situation, with Hitler and the German High Command asking that he be sensitive to Italian feelings.
b) The initial aim of the German High Command was to stabilise the situation in North Africa. This would keep the Italians in the war (their manpower was an important factor in tying up British men and resources) and increase the chances of expelling the British from the Mediterranean theatre, which in turn would be a huge step towards winning the "shipping war." Denied access to the Suez Canal, British ships traveling to and from India and the Far East would have to take an extended route round the African Cape, making them more vulnerable to attack. Rommel's 15th Panzer Division wasn't due to arrive until May and his orders were to stay put and provide a defensive action, blocking the British approach to Tripoli.
c) Rommel had other ideas. He declared "In view of the tenseness of the situation and sluggishness of the Italian High Command, I decided to ignore my orders and take command at the front with my own hands as soon as possible."
Straight away, he was visiting the front line, rallying the Italian troops, personally flying reconnaissance missions and preparing the German 5th Light Division (who had already arrived) for immediate action. With the assistance of German intelligence (which was, temporarily at least, superior to that of the Allies) he concluded that the British were not expecting an attack until May at the earliest and were not in a position to resist him. He struck before the end of March and took El Agheila and Mersa El Brega. The British knew that the game against The Desert Fox was on!
d) Hitler was delighted but the Italian Generals were infuriated. Over the next two years, Gariboldi, Bastico, Cavallero and the rest were exasperated in turn. Whenever they asked Rommel to hold the line, he either attacked or enacted a tactical retreat (for example, when he pulled back out of Cyranaica in December 1941 to give his troops breathing space and secure their supply lines). When, at the beginning of 1942, Rommel was ready once again for the offensive, he didn't tell Bastico or Cavallero about his plans to re-take Benghazi and drive the British out of Libya. He explained the reason in his diary: "Italian Headquarters keep nothing to themselves. Everything they wireless to Rome gets around to British ears." As events unfolded, he continued: "Cavallero implored me not to go on. I told him that nobody but the Fuhrer could change my decision." And then, "It was obvious to me that... the road lay open to Alexandria with only a few British troops to defend it. I and my colleagues would have been fools if we had not done everything to exploit this one and only chance." It was obvious from this last comment that Rommel knew and approved of the "Great Plan" which had been discussed tentatively in Berlin. This was the ambitious proposal to sweep across North Africa taking Alexandria, Cairo, the Suez Canal and even storming on through the oil-rich countries of the Middle-East and up to meet the German armies of Eastern Europe in the Caucases, should they be successful against the Russians. The "one and only chance" Rommel referred to could, if taken to its logical conclusion, mean splitting the British Empire in two, knocking her and the Soviet Union out of the war before the Americans could make an impression on it. Whether it was a desire to follow such a grand strategy or merely a natural determination as a commander to win the campaign in hand, Rommel was not going to stop for his own Fuhrer, let alone German or Italian Generals.
e) Ultimately, Rommel blamed the defeat in North Africa on the unwillingness of his superiors to back him with men and supplies (especially fuel). He had warm words for the Italian troops in the front line: "The performance of the Italian units, more especially of the motorised forces, far surpassed anything the Italian Army had done for a hundred years." But harsh ones for those he called "armchair" leaders like Cavallero: "The cause of... defeat sprang from ... the small interest shown in this war by many high Italian leaders and statesmen." And, most significantly, Rommel's view of Mussolini ended up being his view of dictators in general – he felt that their level of support and trustworthiness "changed with the breeze of fortune."
War of Mobility
a) At the start of the war, Rommel had witnessed and been impressed by the role of the tank during the "blitzkrieg" on Poland. Hitler then gave him the command of 7th Panzer Division and he promptly led them in what he called his "lightning tour" across Europe. They were known as the "Ghost Division". High Command rarely knew where they were and Rommel even had a habit of cutting communications with his superiors to avoid receiving restrictive orders. This kind of mobile, motorised warfare where you concentrated your forces, punched a hole through the enemy lines, then pressed the advantage home and ran them down, laid to rest other ghosts – the stalemate and frustration of the First World War. With his experiences in Europe behind him and a flat, open road to Cairo in front of him, it's no surprise that his Chief of Staff, General Fritz Bayerlain, called him "the best man in the whole German Army for desert war." Rommel believed in taking calculated risks or "bold decisions" because in "motorised warfare... speed of operation and quick reaction of the Command were the decisive factors." This was not the same as taking a gamble. He was confident about moving so quickly: "[it] would not entail any risk to my army's safety. As things were, we could have defended ourselves with success in every possible situation during our advance." Rommel used these tactics to good effect during the early part of the campaign in Libya and Egypt, firmly in the belief that, while the British and Commonwealth soldiers were brave and tough in a static fight, their command structure lacked the speed and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.
b) Admittedly, Rommel asked a lot of his own troops. He drove them hard, often without sleep or supplies and with little food and water. At the first battle of Tobruk, one exhausted junior officer was asked to lead another attack when he only had eight men left under his command. He expressed reservations and Rommel simply enquired whether he'd prefer a court-martial. Another unsuspecting Colonel was caught out in his pyjamas at the crack of dawn by Rommel's habit of turning up on the front line, anywhere and anytime. "You damned lazy fox," he was scolded. "I suppose you were waiting for me to bring you your breakfast."
As it turned out, Rommel never court-martialled any of his men in North Africa and certainly never asked them to do anything he wasn't prepared to do himself. The importance he gave to being alongside the troops, even to the point of moving his headquarters and Chief of Staff to the front line with him, won the respect of Germans and Italians alike. They marvelled at his instinct for moving away from a location just before enemy shells landed or an attack broke through and at his courage in going behind enemy lines on reconnaissance missions in his own vehicle (not to mention the confidence he showed at bluffing his way back past the British by "hallooing" at them in English). Some saw it as a bad omen that he was not present, due to illness, when the battle of El Alamein began. By that stage, however, even Rommel didn't think that his inspirational qualities could change the outcome.
At El Alamein, he'd been forced to abandon mobile operations in favour of the defensive, blocking action he so disliked.
c) Earlier in the summer, Rommel's instinct that his army was more responsive than the enemy had been proved right. For example, in June 1942, when General Wavell had made his last attempt to take the British and Commonwealth forces back into Libya during Operation Battleaxe, Rommel had combined some of his favourite tactics to thwart him. He'd blunted the enemy's sword on his shield and then thrust forward with his own spear. Hiding his heavy tanks and artillery behind sand dunes, the wily Desert Fox had lured the British tank force out with a bait of German Light Division vehicles. Some of these were fitted with aircraft propeller engines, stirring up the dust to make them look like heavy tanks. Others trailed bushes and bits of flotsam and jetsam behind them, again to stir the dust and give the impression that they were greater in number. Rommel then smashed the enemy tanks with his 88mm guns (that he'd first adapted from anti-aircraft fire to the role of tank-busting with devastating effect in France), saving his own offensive resources for a well-judged armoured counter-stroke round the British desert flank at Sidi Omar. This had sent Wavell's men scurrying back and called "last orders" on his command of the 8th Army.
d) However, by the time the opposing sides took up positions at El Alamein, the logistics had changed dramatically. The narrow piece of terrain that the Allies had chosen to draw their "line in the sand," together with the overwhelming superiority Montgomery held in terms of men, tanks, artillery, supplies and air support had given Rommel the opinion that a British victory was a foregone conclusion.
e) Nevertheless Rommel began to focus on new priorities. He proved that he could defend as well as attack when he laid "The Devil's Garden" – German mines mixed with former British and dummy minefields that ended up giving Montgomery such a headache on the El Alamein front line. When the Allied breakthrough finally came, he immediately realised that an orderly retreat to a stronger position was needed. He presumed that Montgomery would continue to be patient, even cautious in the chase and so once again took a calculated risk that a series of well organised rear-guard actions along the coast would give his army the chance to escape back to Tunisia.
Rommel, as ever, was in the thick of the action, directing the flow of men and traffic with his officers. He arranged columns, lanes and control points and made sure that the rear-guard skirmishes stung the British enough to prevent them pulling an outflanking manoeuvre. This all helped to keep the morale of his battle-weary troops remarkably high. Rommel intended to make it look like a change of tactics rather than a defeat. In his view, the withdrawal was a controlled military operation, leading to a concentration of Axis forces in Tunisia that would be ready to take on the twin threat of Montgomery coming from the east and Eisenhower's 1st Army recently landed in Algeria to the west.
Most typically, this action was carried out against the wishes of the Italian High Command and involved the rejection of a direct order to stand and fight from Hitler. Rommel later admitted that his greatest mistake was not disobeying Hitler sooner.
The Fuhrer And His "Scallywags"
a) Rommel first met Hitler in 1934 when the latter passed through Goslar. Rommel's battalion, based in the town, was asked to parade in honour of the Fuhrer's visit. This was a time when the Nazi Party had begun to infiltrate every level of German society and shadow every institution, so the battalion was informed that a line of S.S. troops would stand in front of them on parade when Hitler passed by. Rommel started as he meant to go on. He announced that his soldiers were professional enough to form the guard of honour without the need for the S.S., who had to be removed or his own men would not turn out. After a meeting with Himmler and Goebbels, Rommel got his way.
b) Rommel commented later that he found Himmler cold and charm less but that he hit it off with Goebbels. Goebbels liked him, liked the fact that he had character and saw the potential of using him for the Nazi publicity machine. This was maximised during the North African campaign, when Rommel became the nearest thing in the German Army to a movie star. His dashing style, his "man of action" image, his eye for fashion (the long coat, the goggles, the "Rupert Bear" scarf) and of course his initial breathtaking military success made him a publicity dream for the Nazi leaders, who milked every film and photo opportunity to satisfy the German public's demand for their new hero. When Tobruk fell, much of the equipment belonging to the 33,000 captured Allied troops was sent back to Germany and given as "presents from Rommel" to the boys of the Hitler Youth. Women sent him fan mail, some of it saucy enough to make him smile. He could do no wrong.
c) At this point in time, Hitler was delighted with his protégé. Ever since his success in Europe, Rommel had been given favoured status with the Fuhrer. Hitler had read Rommel's book about his experiences in the First War, "The Infantry Attacks," had been impressed with his style and ability and been a fan ever since. In return, Rommel was happy to be fêted this way even though he'd never joined the Nazi Party and claimed that he wasn't interested in politics. He admired men like Hitler and Goebbels for their leadership qualities and charisma. After all, they had made Germany great again and ensured that his beloved German Army took pride of place in that "greatness."
d) By contrast, Rommel had a low opinion of the Nazis as a group. Somewhat naively, he thought that Hitler had surrounded himself with bully-boys merely to consolidate power and sooner or later would dispense with this "set of scallywags." This was a view that he aired publicly and it was to make him enemies.
At first, Hitler seemed happy to indulge Rommel's blunt opinions on his superiors and insubordination in military operations. Rommel would play German and Italian High Command off against each other and against Hitler when justifying his tactics or angling for more support and resources in North Africa. Hitler tolerated this because he couldn't argue with Rommel's success and popularity. But as the tide of war turned, it was inevitable that the novelty of Rommel's outspokenness would wear thin. There were people in high places that resented his special relationship with the Fuhrer and were ready to pounce if fortunes changed.
e) And fortunes did change. The Germans were eventually defeated and evicted from Africa, the Allies landed first in Italy, then in Normandy and the Russians started to push forward from the East. Hitler began to react less favourably to Rommel's continued challenges to his authority and attacks on his "inner circle." Rommel at last saw the truth himself. He realised the full extent of the Nazi's policy towards the Jews and the civilian populations right across Europe. He'd seen the way other generals had dishonoured the name of the Wehrmacht in their brutal treatment of Russian prisoners. He knew that more lives were going to be wasted as Germany headed towards certain defeat and disaster. And when, with inimitable directness, he broached the subject with Hitler, he now received the Fuhrer's wrath instead of his favour. Hitler wasn't going to dispense with the "scallywags" after all. He was "Chief Scallywag."
f) Rommel now found himself back in France leading the resistance to the Allied advance from Normandy. He expressed his opinion forthrightly: "Hitler's orders are nonsense; the man must be mad... it is essential to make peace at once."
This made him a champion to those German officers and statesmen who wished to remove Hitler and save the German nation by suing for peace. Respected by the Allies, who could have done business with him because he wasn't a Nazi and adored as "The People's Marshal" by the German public and soldiers alike, he would have been the ideal candidate to lead the country away from total destruction.
However, the same attributes made him a traitor to Nazi sycophants like Keitel and Jodl. And a scapegoat when, on July 20th 1944, an attempt was made on Hitler's life. There was nothing to link Rommel to the assassination attempt and he spoke openly on the subject: "That was altogether the wrong way to go about it... The man is a devil incarnate but why try to make a hero and a martyr of him? He should have been arrested by the Army and brought to trial." Despite this, his mere presence obviously posed a threat and, as Desmond Young describes it, "Hitler's passion and resentment were aroused... He had come to hate him [Rommel] and hatred in his case had only one form of expression."
g) To use the "school playground" analogy, it's all very well to be the school bully's best mate when he's in a good mood – he'll protect you. But school bullies, like dictators, tend to be paranoid, unpredictable and cruel people. When their mood changes, it's the best mate that's most likely to get punched. For Rommel, "punched" meant being given the choice between a show trial for treason or "death in three seconds" from a poison capsule. He was told that if he took the latter he would be given a hero's state funeral and his family would not be harmed. The capsule was the only option for a man like Rommel – "I will never allow myself to be hanged by that man Hitler. I planned no murder. I only tried to serve my country."
A "Stout-Hearted Adversary"
a) Considering the nature of the Nazi regime and the way in which the German Army, influenced by the S.S., behaved elsewhere, it may have been a surprise to the British and Commonwealth forces that Rommel and his desert troops played so fair. There's no question that he was ruthless in his drive for victory and gave no quarter in battle. But as we've seen he was a fair minded and professional soldier, not a cruel warrior.
When prisoners were taken they were not beaten or mistreated. They were shown an almost old-fashioned courtesy. Rommel gave them the same rations as his own men and on occasions he was known to have cut his own troops' share to even things out. When misunderstandings occurred between the German and British Commands about the capture and treatment of prisoners (for example, over whether to feed or interrogate them first) he would follow the practice of the British exactly and then find time to communicate with their Commanders and iron things out. When the British declared their intention to "kill the Germans wherever they found them" and Hitler responded with a "take no prisoners" directive to his own generals, Rommel burnt the Fuhrer's orders to avoid an "aggravation of the war." It was General Auchinleck that referred to Erwin Rommel as "a stout-hearted adversary."
b) It has already been mentioned that Rommel was keen to evaluate his own performances honestly and he applied the same rule to everyone else. He liked to give credit where credit was due.
In November 1941, he reacted angrily when an order he'd given, to push forward to the Egyptian border, was cancelled by a Lieutenant Colonel Westphal. Afterwards, however, on realising that Westphal's position at rear headquarters near Tobruk had on this occasion given the junior officer a better overall perspective of the situation (especially with access to the latest air reports), Rommel congratulated him, told him he'd done the right thing and expressed his gratitude.
c) Although he thought the British and Commonwealth chain of command was too cautious and inflexible, Rommel did speak highly of General Wavell and his earlier campaign against the Italians. Indeed, he carried with him a translated copy of Wavell's essays on generalship. Rommel also had praise for the British troops, commenting on their discipline, bravery and most particularly their "special operations" (Commando and S.A.S. manoeuvres, etc.). He referred many times to the toughness and determination of all the Commonwealth forces, especially the Australian and New Zealand soldiers, and horrified the Nazi generals when he grudgingly admitted an admiration for the tenacious performance of the "coloured Englishmen" of the Indian Divisions. He was surprised and impressed that these men, from such different parts of the world could come together and fight as an effective Commonwealth Army. And on hearing that Kiwi General Freyberg had escaped the German invasion of Crete and arrived to face him in North Africa, Rommel said that he "would have been happier if he [Freyberg] had been safely tucked up in one of our prisoner camps instead of still fighting us."
d) Rommel wrote later that the British and their Allies were wise to give such a priority, in terms of men and resources, to the North African campaign. He acknowledged how crucial the battle of El Alamein had been as a turning point in the war. Considering how honest he was, he probably accepted that it had been a turning point in his own destiny as well.
Conclusion – Not So Much "Superman" or "Bogeyman" As Altogether Too Human
General Auchinleck was of the opinion that "Rommel stood out... because he had overcome the innate rigidity of the German military mind and was a master of improvisation." In other words, he was a free thinker, made his feelings known, acted upon them and wore his heart on his sleeve. Sometimes this meant that he ignored overall strategy to pursue the immediate victory at hand, sometimes that he made rash mistakes in battle... and enemies in high places. But for the most part, these qualities were the reasons for his success. Ultimately, they also cost him his life.
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