Supercharge line/Rahman Track: Armoured Operations At Alamein - Supercharge
Andrew Colquhoun, Assistant Librarian, IWM
Ground Orientation
This stand was delivered by the side of the coach, which had pulled up somewhere in the middle of the desert next to an Egyptian military base. It was a great shame that we were unable to hold the stand where we had intended to at the start line for Operation Supercharge.
Introduction
The failure of the armour initially to break through led Montgomery to alter his battle plan. The 9th Australian Division was to put pressure on the Axis forces in the north, through a series of crumbling operations.
The New Zealand Division was to attack with two British infantry brigades, 151st and 152nd, attached. Brigadier Currie's 9th Armoured Brigade was then expected to pass through the cleared tracks-Diamond, Boomerang, and Two Bar-past the infantry bridgehead to cross the Rahman Track and to engage the enemy armour in a decisive tank battle. Currie had warned Freyberg that the operation could cost up to 50% casualties, to which Freyberg replied that the Army Commander was prepared to accept 100% casualties so long as the objective was achieved. Due to be launched on the night of 31st October/1st November, the operation was put back by a day; Z hour was set for 1.05am on 2nd November.
The Charge of the 9th Brigade
Currie's 9th Armoured Brigade numbered 123 tanks. At 6.15am (30 minutes before first light) it went into the attack, Warwickshire Yeomanry on the left, Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry in the centre, and the 3rd Hussars on the right. Initially, the advance went well; 3rd Hussars and Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry met little resistance, but near to the Rahman Track they came under heavy fire. Warwickshire Yeomanry ran into stiff opposition. Brigadier Lucas-Phillips in his well-known account described the action as follows:
Thus, for a while, the British tanks carried all before them. In the north and centre the leading squadrons of 3rd Hussars and the Wiltshires, their machine-guns blazing, reached the Rahman Track while it was dark and passed well beyond. The remaining squadrons followed, but the night was nearly spent and, as the eastern sky began to lighten, the British tanks were silhouetted against it and the enemy's heavy guns that were disposed in depth opened a devastating fire against their black shapes. In an instant the whole character of the action was transformed. The enemy gunners and infantry who had surrendered ran back to their weapons and manned them. Along and beyond the now discernable telegraph poles there took place what an officer of 3rd Hussars described as "a desperate and bloody encounter". Both sides hammered each other "even at the cannon's mouth", but, whereas the enemy in the open could clearly see the shapes of the British tanks, the gunner inside the tank was as though blindfold and could at first do no more than sweep the ground ahead with his Browning or his Besa.1
Bernard Freyberg himself described the action as:
... a desperate and gallant battle right in the enemy gun-line. Although the 9th brigade did not reach its objective and had heavy casualties, the action was a success, as the enemy gun-line was smashed.2
The Brigade's losses were horrific. Of the 94 tanks which fought the enemy gun-line, 75 were knocked out. Out of the 400 officers and men of the Brigade, 230 became casualties. In all, the Brigade lost 103 tanks during the whole of the night's operations.
After the 9th Brigade's action, Brigadier Gentry of the 6th New Zealand Brigade went ahead to survey the scene. On seeing Currie asleep on a stretcher, he approached him saying, 'Sorry to wake you John, but I'd like to know where your tanks are?' Currie waved his hand at a group of tanks around him, replying 'There they are.' Gentry was puzzled. 'I don't mean your headquarters tanks, I mean your armoured regiments. Where are they?' Currie waved his arm and again replied, 'There are my armoured regiments, Bill.'3
Currie had been prepared to sacrifice his brigade to effect a breakthrough, but would Fisher's 2nd Armoured Brigade exploit his success and push out through the enemy gun-line to bring on a decisive tank-on-tank battle against the enemy armour? Currie was extremely bitter that 2nd Armoured brigade had not kept up and did not hurl itself into the attack in an attempt to smash through the gun-line.
In 1961, in correspondence with Brigadier Lucas-Phillips, in the preparation for the latter's book, Briggs was adamant that Fisher had done the right thing:
"I do know Currie was very critical of 1 Armd. Div. not being sufficiently close up to take advantage of his "success". If they had been I fear the story would have been a correspondingly similar one and its effect equally unsuccessful. The plain answer is that armour can't charge concealed and semi-concealed guns just behind a crest [underlined by Briggs] and get away with it. These have to be dealt with methodically by stalking, H.E. fire and artillery concentrations and this takes time."4
On balance, it was probably possible for 2nd Armoured Brigade to have thrust through the German gun-line; however, Fisher saw his role as bringing the enemy to battle and destroying it from hull-down positions, on ground of his own choosing. Ultimately the operations of 2nd November were to have this effect.
2nd Armoured Brigade was to deploy two miles north-west of Tell el Aqqaqir, whilst 8th Armoured Brigade was to deploy to Tell el Aqqaqir itself. 7th Motor Brigade was to position itself between the two.
All three armoured regiments of 2nd Armoured Brigade were soon brought to a standstill as a result of concentrated fire from tanks and anti-tank guns. By 10.15am, 8th Armoured Brigade came up to the left of 2nd Armoured Brigade. Although the advance had been halted in the light of an armoured counter-attack, they were nonetheless fully engaged in a decisive tank-on-tank battle as was hoped.
Over 70 German tanks were destroyed for a loss of 54, of which 40 were recovered and repairable by REME. Following the action at Tell el Aqqaqir the Deutsche Afrika Korps lost its mobile striking force, being reduced to 32 tanks.
What Lessons for Armoured Operations Were Learnt at Alamein?
After the battle a document Lessons from Operations Oct. and Nov. 1942 (Middle Eastern Training Memorandum No. 7) was produced to ensure that all arms adopted techniques developed as a result of the experience gained at Alamein.
The clearance of minefields was a major aspect of the Alamein battle. One of the main recommendations of the Memorandum was that where armour is to deploy through an enemy minefield, it is essential for infantry to clear a gap all the way through the minefield before calling the armour forward. Armour fighting in a close support role is to be called forward as required, not to lead the attack.
The document put forward a number of recommendations for improving training and cooperation between infantry and armour. Where joint infantry and armour operations are to be mounted, it is essential to train units together: thus, the infantry battalion would train with the armoured regiment it is to work with, the infantry company would work with the squadron, and the platoon would train with the troop that it is to go into battle with.
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