Crete and El Alamein: IWM/AWM Study Tour 2002 Crete and El Alamein: IWM/AWM Study Tour 2002
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Royal Navy: Part 2

2/1st & 2/11th Battalions



Lightfoot start line: 51st Highland Division

Clare Simpson, Senior PA to the Director General, IWM

Introduction

The Highland Division can trace its origins back to the Highland Regiment (or Black Watch) who first patrolled the Scottish Perthshire Hills in 1740. In 1908 a reorganisation of the Territorial Army brought all of the kilted Highland regiments together to form the 51st Highland Division and by the end of the First World War, the Division, only ten years old, had already established a legendary reputation due to its performance in the major battle zones. The Highland Division, or the "Highway Decorators", as they were often called, because of their famous cipher daubed everywhere they went, became the most famous infantry Division that fought with the British Army in WW2, taking part in no less than thirteen major battles: a superb track record marred only by the abject humiliation they were to suffer at St Valery in France in 1940, when, after a bitter fight, they were surrounded by the German forces, forced to surrender and taken into captivity.

Montgomery said of the 51st later:

"Of the many fine Divisions that served under me in the Second World War, none were finer than the Highland Division. It was the only infantry Division in the armies of the British Empire that accompanied me during the whole of the long march from Alamein to Berlin".

In 1941 the 51st Highlanders were regrouped and arrived in North Africa in 1942, accompanied by their kilted pipers, to join the Eighth Army in the Western Desert, under the command of 'Lang Tam' Douglas Wimberley. Still not considered battle worthy by Churchill, the troops were ordered to man and defend the Nile front.

Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery arrived in Cairo on 12 August 1942 when Eighth Army morale was at its lowest point. He was the fourth Eighth Army Commander in swift succession, and a relatively unknown commodity. Described by one observer as a "little general with white knobbly knees", he was introduced to the Highlanders, although the troops were not initially impressed: Monty quite openly admitted that he had never been to Scotland in his life.

The Division was still guarding Cairo and the Delta when on 30/31st August Montgomery gained his first (defensive) victory on the Alam El Halfa Ridge. By 7th September Rommel withdrew towards the Heimeimat Ridge, having suffered 3000 casualties, losing 50 tanks and 55 guns.

In early September the Division were instructed to move towards the front line and eventually into the narrow stretch of desert at El Alamein. This location marked the most crucial point on the Mediterranean coast in Egypt, only 68 kilometres wide between the sea and the impassable Quattara Depression. This was the gateway to Alexandria, the Nile Delta, the Suez Canal and access to the oil fields of the east.

The sand became a true irritant to the soldiers: settling on the skin and getting into their hair, their food and everywhere else. In these harsh conditions, the troops methodically practised full-scale attack exercises at night to ensure that the infantry became accustomed to every aspect of the forthcoming battle: the din of artillery barrages, the enemy minefields etc. Training in desert navigation became essential; existing maps were inaccurate and showed few land features. The men took part in extensive compass marches, and they learned to survive with the minimum of water rationing, to brew up in desert fires made of sand and petrol, and to cope with the constant bane of swarming flies and scorching sun.

The Highland Division now became affiliated to the tough 9th Australian Division, who were amenable comrades in addition to being an informed authority on desert warfare. It proved to be a highly successful combination of forces with each unit of "Jocks" assigned to one of "Diggers". As Monty said later: "It has always been an interesting thing to me how the Scottish soldier very quickly makes friends with the Dominion soldier. It may be because both of them are slightly uncivilised. It does pay, though, to know that fact in battle...".

Monty was a firm believer in so-called 'walking the course' and every Division carried out meticulous preparations first at Battalion, then Brigade and Divisional level, for the impending attack. A final conference to discuss tactics was held on 17th October when the final battle plan was drawn up and forced through by Montgomery.

Battle Plan

Monty's plan was twofold: instead of first sending armour against the enemy to do the breaking up and then following up with infantry, the GOC in Command decided to have his infantry first force a gap through the huge German minefields and Rommel's outer defences (Operation Lightfoot) through which the Armoured Divisions (in Operation Supercharge) could later pour, flood out, and destroy the enemy completely.

The second idea was to cheat the enemy into believing that Montgomery intended to force a gap in the weak defence of the south, while in actual fact the attack was to be made on the enemy's strongest positions in the north. Montgomery accordingly gathered together a concentration of dummy tanks on his southern rear and moved 13th Corps into that area. General Oliver Leese, leading the 30th Corps was to provide the main thrust on a four Divisional Front, from which two gaps were to be driven through the enemy's minefields.

Between the coastal road and the Quattara Depression, the Eighth Army and the Afrika Korps were to face each other across the minefields and barbed wire. From north to south Rommel was to place in front 164 Infantry, Trieste and 90th Light Division and behind them 15th Panzer, Littorio and Bologna Divisions; then 21st Panzer, Arriete and Brescia Divisions, the Fulgore and Pavia Divisions. In between the six Italian Divisions there were German infantry including the famous 90th Light Division. Facing them, also north and south there were to be the 9th Australian and 51st Highland to force the Northern Corridor through the defences, and 2nd New Zealand and 1st South African with 4th Indian Division in reserve. Then the 50th Northumbrian, 44th Home Counties Divisions and the Free French. The placement of the 51st Highland Division between the 9th Australian Division on the right and the 2nd New Zealand Division on the left was to ensure that the Highland Division was strategically located between the two most experienced fighting Divisions then in action.

The men of the 51st required 50 rounds of ammunition per gun. Each infantry battalion was to go into the attack without any transport except Bren carriers carrying ammo, including grenades, mortar bombs, supplies and water. Each man carried his personal weapon and equipment, a small pack with cardigan/jersey and Tam O'Shanter or cap comforter, two grenades in .55 anti-tank ammo bandolier or spare respirator haversack, 50 rounds of extra ammo in a bandolier, one day's rations and a full water bottle. All were equipped with a pick or shovel and an entrenching tool. Four sandbags were carried tied to the small pack that contained ground sheet, shaving kit and iron ration. White St Andrews crosses for identification were tied across the back of the small pack. No anti-tank rifles were to be taken. The attack formation consisted of two companies forward and two in reserve in the battalion. HQ led by a compass party in the centre of the square. Distance between soldiers was to be maintained at no less than five yards; and speed of advance was 100 yards in two minutes up to the first enemy minefield, then 100 yards per three minutes.

On the night of 22 October the Highland Division moved silently up along tracks (Sun, Moon, Star, Boat, Bottle and Hut) and by 2300 hours had settled to rest in previously constructed slit trenches highly camouflaged, to wait for action the next day. No cooking was possible and the men ate their cold meals as they lay in their makeshift beds. The Divisional objectives were made clear to each and every man: to secure 7000 yards of African desert, across the treacherous minefields, barbed wire, enemy dugouts and slit trenches fighting against well-armed German and Italian formations. The use of white tape (nine miles of it in all, marked by pickets every 50 yards) on the terrain would allow the troops to maintain their course over the nine separate routes so that the other Battalions could advance in a phased order over the darkened terrain. The anti-tank guns, bren-carriers and other operational vehicles were prepared to move up and park to await their chance to cross the minefields.

Monty rallied the troops by sending the following message:

"We are ready now. The battle which is now about to begin will be one of the decisive battles of history. It will be the turning point of the war. The eyes of the whole world will be on us, watching anxiously which way the battle will swing. We can give them the answer at once. 'It will swing our way'. We have first class equipment, good tanks, good anti-tank guns (6 pounders had just arrived), plenty of artillery (over 1000 guns) and plenty of ammunition and we are backed up by the finest air striking force in the world. All that is necessary is that each one of us, every officer and man, should enter this battle with the determination to see it through - to fight and to kill - and finally to win..."

At 2140 hours on 23 October, under a full moon, the troops moved forward to the accompaniment of a thunderous bombardment of gunfire and stirring Scottish piping. At that appointed second, 882 field and medium guns opened fire in Monty's words "like one battery" Tracer from anti-aircraft guns continued to pound, providing adequate illumination of the terrain and the guiding white tape. Part of the GOC's Order for the Day read: "There will be no surrender for unwounded men. Any troops of the Highland Division cut off, will continue to fight".

Lt Col Jerry Sheil, 128 Field Regt, kept a diary:

"23rd. Morning of the battle. We are ready and keen and very fit. This should be a good scrap. The barrage opened at 22.00 hours and was a magnificent sight. The darkness of the night was stabbed by flashes as far as the eye could see and the roar of the guns and whine of the shells overhead most impressive. It was not long before the first success signal came in. The 5 Camerons had reached their first objective. So it went on through the night. Confused reports kept coming in. On the whole the information from our FOO was splendid".

The Order of Battle

The GOC's plan of attack from north to south was 1st Gordons and 5th Black Watch in right lane, then in left lane 5/7th Gordons, next 1st Black Watch, 7th Argylls, then the Recce Battalion with some tanks (50 RTR) and finally on the extreme left/south were 5th Camerons next to the NZ Division. They had first to take two objectives when 7th Black Watch would pass through. Leapfrogging by battalions could only take place on the two flanks. Therefore, six Battalions of the Highland Division would advance side by side into battle.

On the map for the attack, the names of Scottish towns intimately connected with the attacking regiments, were used to designate objectives.

The first objective was Green Line, from right to left, Arbroath, Forfar, Cruden, Dollar, Mons Meg, Paisley, Drummuir, Inverness.
Next Red Line, Turriff, Insch, Killin. Some two miles from the final objective, where start lines would be secured for the second phase. This was secured by 5th Black Watch with good precision. 1st Gordon Highlanders, accompanied by Middlesex machine gunners, leap-frogged them at the halfway line and made for Aberdeen. This was a defended locality on the long, low feature to become notorious in the ensuing struggle for what became known as the 'Kidney Ridge'.

The Black Line, Dufftown, Braemar, Strichen, Perth, Greenock, Blath and Dundee. The strong outpost Greenock was stormed and the Line secured by the Argylls. 5/7th Highlanders progressed well until reaching Strichen, where they met a wall of barrage. The company dug in and eventually it was taken the next day. 1st Black Watch, overcoming all opposition, went right through to the Black line, their objective, in excellent order. Captain Gerald Osborne seized a battery 1,000 yards ahead before being recalled.

Finally the Blue Line, Aberdeen, Stirling, Nairn, Kirkcaldy were on the final Corps objective. These were the enemy's strongest defences. Aberdeen and Stirling were hard targets. Stirling was largely dead ground, but heavily impregnated with mines of all sorts, including large aircraft bombs - a factor that applied equally to the whole of the southern half of the Highland Division sector. From the start line the Argylls and their Middlesex machine gunners incurred heavy casualties from the enemy's counter-barrage and mines. D Company lost all of its officers and a large aircraft bomb wiped out a whole platoon. 7th Black Watch leapfrogged the 5th Camerons at the halfway line and proceeded to direct their attack on Kirkcaldy, that part of the Corps final objective which lay beyond Miteiriya Ridge, where it culminated in Point 33. Between it and the line where the Black Watch took over from the Camerons was the intermediate Black Line, which lay at the foot of the ridge. Although casualties were terrible, the Black Watch achieved its goal of reaching the Black Line but the strength of the four rifle companies had been reduced by more than half. The Blue Line was finally taken with forty men which had begun 200 strong. 1st Gordons had a particular struggle with Aberdeen but it was eventually taken after a bloody battle that witnessed the first infantry versus armour action of Alamein.

During the battle, Monty had instructed that there would only be one shell every forty five yards. It was to be mainly a series of moving concentrations of shell fire on known or suspected points of enemy resistance. The first fifteen minutes of firing were to concentrate on the enemy's own gun positions, plotted from air photographs and other means, in order to reduce the volume of fire attacking the British infantry.

By the night of 26th October the Division had reached all its objectives - an advance of six miles - but with a loss of over 2100 casualties. They had not captured all their objectives on the first night: there had been stiff opposition at the halfway line resulting in devastating casualties. The minefields too, had been more numerous than expected. The capture of Stirling had also been a struggle but Montgomery, on reflection, had good cause for restrained satisfaction.

After the War, Montgomery addressed an audience consisting of many senior officers of the 51st Highland Division. He reflected with these words:

"It is at once a humiliation and an honour to have had such a Division under one's command. I shall always remember the Highland Division with admiration and high regard".

Operation Supercharge - The Second Battle of Alamein

Monty assumed that the 'wearing down' in terrible attritional fighting of the Afrika Korps was completed by the end of October. Operation Supercharge was to be in two parts. A night attack by the 51st Highland and the 2nd New Zealand divisions would be advancing 4000 yards on a 4000 yard frontage putting tremendous pressure on the defenders. A gap would be created through which the British armour (1st Armoured and the NZ tank brigades) would pour through. The dangerous salient was called Thomson's Post or simply The Thumb. 152 Brigade were placed under command of Lt General Freyberg. Behind a huge barrage of 15,000 rounds fired over four and a half hours at 0100 on 2nd November, 152 Brigade set off, 5th Camerons on the left, 5th Seaforth on the right, each with 1000 yard frontage. 2nd Seaforth would follow through and mop up along the ridge known as El Wiska.

5th Camerons went in and achieved at a very high cost their objectives amidst the enemy armour. Four officers were killed and nine wounded. By 0600 the Brigade had achieved its objectives. The enemy counter-attacked in the early afternoon on 2nd November and a few hours later 152 Brigade made a further advance of 1500 yards without loss, taking 100 Italians POW. By the morning of 3rd November it was obvious that the enemy were making a general withdrawal, and on the morning of the 4th the outnumbered Axis forces were forced into a full retreat.





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El Alamein

Naval Operations

Filming in the Desert

2/24th Battalion and 621 Company

Conditions

Defense of Tel el Eisa

The Saucer

Logistics

Alam el Halfa

Indian Army

51st Highland Division

Armour at El Alamein

Supercharge

Rommel