Ruweisat Ridge: The Indian Army in North Africa

Alan Jeffreys, Curator, IWM

The Indian Army in North Africa

Indian troops landed in North Africa in 1939. The 4^th Indian Division fought with the Western Desert Force at the Battle of Sidi Barrani, 11 December 1940 and was also involved in Operations Battleaxe and Crusader. Indian troops quickly adapted to the conditions in North Africa as they were used to warfare on the North West Frontier that involved training in suitable terrain and long absences from home. The Indian troops were highly regarded in the Mediterranean theatre for being well-trained and for their steadfastness. ¹

18^th Indian Infantry Brigade at Deir el Shein

One very important delaying action by an Indian Army formation was at Deir el Shein by 18^th Indian Infantry Brigade. It was the last battle of the retreat to El Alamein. Deir el Shein was saucer-shaped and its choice was largely dictated because it was the only place in the area that it was possible to dig in. It was four miles north-west of Ruweisat Ridge which was solid rock and as a result was important to the defence of the Alamein position.

The brigade had just arrived from Iraq under the temporary command of Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Gray of 2/3^rd Gurkhas, the remainder of the brigade consisted of 2/5^th Essex Regiment and 4/11^th Sikh Regiment. Gray had just spent a year in the Adjutant's Branch and base and the Essex battalion and Gurkhas had never been in action. The brigade had not even been able to train in the use of the 2-pounder anti-tank guns.

The brigade spent their first two days digging, wiring and mining. In addition, only dry rations had been brought up and water allowance was three-quarters of a gallon per day. A defensive 'box' might have been possible if there had been enough time to build it, but the compressors arrived too late to dig emplacements and the full quota of mines arrived too late to be laid. In addition three different types of mines had been delivered but often without fuses as there was no Royal Engineers Officer in charge of issuing. According to Colonel Bamfield, Commanding Officer (CO) 4/11^th Sikh Regiment:

Guns did not exist when we first arrived but there were rumours of some coming from various sources. Eventually, the Commander, 121 Field Regiment RA arrived and after a reconnaissance sited the guns we expected. These were eighteen 25-pounders, sixteen 6-pounders and twenty 2-pounders A-tk. There was little time to dig them in and they later suffered accordingly. ²

The brigade had no signal equipment and was short of ammunition and the supporting artillery regiments, 79^th and 121^st Field Regiments, had fought all the way back from Tobruk.

The 'box' itself was about 4000 by 2000 yards. The brigade took up positions, with the Sikhs on the north-west, the Essex on the north-east with the Gurkhas in a semi-circular front of about 6000 yards on the east and 66th Field Company, Sappers & Miners holding the south-west. There were gaps in the perimeter due to the lack of mines. There were also four medium machine guns manned by men of the Cheshire Regiment, seven Matilda tanks with crews from 42nd Royal Tank Regiment. The 2-pounders were manned by South African units together with personnel from the Welch Regiment. The 6-pounders were manned from various units, the Advanced Dressing Station from 32^nd Field Ambulance and lastly there were some South African sappers with compressors.

On the 1 July at 9am the German shelling began for an hour on the Essex positions and then over the whole box. At 11.15am two British prisoners were sent in to offer surrender terms that were refused. In the afternoon under the cover of a heavy dust storm, the enemy advanced through the gap in the minefield and formed up behind the Essex and the Gurkhas. This was followed by 12 Mark IV tanks and some light tanks. The Essex anti-tank guns and 25-pounders accounted for two before surrendering. The tanks moved on towards the Sikhs, where a troop of 2-pounders destroyed two panzers. The tanks destroyed the four remaining 25-pounders. According to The Tiger Kills: 'The German tank crews found the mess tent and stopped to drink up the beer'. ³ Some of the Sikhs managed to escape, but 7 officers and 500 men were missing. The tanks then attacked the Gurkha positions, who withdrew from the position but two companies ran into a tank park. The Gurkhas and the Sikhs were the most heavily hit, with the Gurkhas losing 12 officers and 580 men and their CO was captured and Sikhs losing 3 Officers and 370 Other Ranks.

At the same time there was heavy shelling of Brigade Headquarters (HQ) and was overrun by five tanks supported by infantry guns. The Brigade CO was injured and the HQ captured, although some did manage to escape. At about 7pm the Battalion HQ of 2/3 Gurkhas evacuated the area. A and C Companies were cut off but also managed to escape through a gap in the area as did the remainder of the Brigade, particularly after the diversion of an Allied bombardment. Most of the survivors managed to get to El Alamein box. Due to the 'fog of war' support eventually came with 22^nd Brigade and its 18 tanks in the early evening and then withdrew after dark. The Brigade destroyed 8 Panzers for the loss of four tanks.

The New Zealand Official History has commented on the importance of this delaying action by 18^th Indian Infantry Brigade:

Contemporary records do not do justice to 18 Brigade. Auchinleck mentions its 'stalwart resistance' and that 'the stand made by the brigade certainly gained valuable time for the organisation of the Alamein Line generally' (Despatch, p. 364). Post-war revelations of all the facts show that the brigade did much more than this. Tactically and administratively insecure though it was, the brigade fought with a vigour that upset Rommel's battle plan. Just as the fighting in July marked the turn of Allied fortunes in the Middle East, so the action of 18 Brigade on 1 July may be said to have marked the turn of the battle on the Alamein Line. Had Eighth Army been able to avail itself of the opportunity created by the brigade, a crushing defeat might have been imposed on Rommel. ⁴

Finally, on display in the main atrium in the Museum at Lambeth Road is a 25-pounder Mark II that was recently conserved by the conservation staff in the Department of Exhibits and Firearms. It served with 11^th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery attached to 5^th Indian Division. On 15 June 1942, the regiment was transferred from Iraq to the Western Desert and covered the 1500 miles in 11 days. This unit was also involved in a delaying action and helped halt the German attack on 2 July at Ruweisat Ridge. Together with 1/4^th Essex Regiment they formed ROBCOL commanded by Brigadier R. P. Waller. According to the Divisional history:

Shortly after 1000 hours on July 2^nd, from a position near the tip of the ridge, 11 Field Regiment began to hammer masses of enemy transport in the Deir el Shein area. A German lorried infantry group threw in a quick attack, apparently to test the strength of the blocking forces. Enemy artillery found the range and searched the crest of the ridge. The panzers followed forward to mount the high ground. They were beaten back. As they swung to flank the steady fire of the 25-pounders followed them. The Essex in their covering positions sat tight all day under continuous bombardment. Casualties mounted. By nightfall 7 guns had been knocked out and ammunition was all but exhausted. But for the first time since Tobruk, Rommel's armour had broken off action and had retired into the west. ⁵

Footnotes:
¹ See Gerard Douds, 'Matters of Honour': Indian troops in the North African and Italian, in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (editors), Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 1997), pp. 121-126.
² Major P. C. Bharucha, Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945: The North African Campaign 1940-43 (India & Pakistan: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, 1956), p. 548.
³ Government of India, The Tiger Kills: The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaign (London: HMSO), p. 147.
⁴ Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Scoullar, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45: Battle for Egypt: The Summer of 1942 (Wellington: War History Branch, 1955), p. 159.
⁵ G. R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division (Toronto: McLaren & Son, 1949), p.182.