Alam el Halfa: The Battle of Alam el Halfa

Chris Plant, Curator, IWM

The "six day race" – the battle of Alam El Halfa, 31st August – 5th September.

Alam El Halfa was the back to the wall battle that the newly promoted Montgomery had to fight when he first arrived in Egypt, before he was able successfully to go on the offensive a few months later. Before looking at the battle itself, it is crucial to understand the situation that was facing both sides. For Rommel this situation not only dictated the timetable he had to follow in the run up to the battle, but also the way his forces were able to fight during the six days and, to an extent, the eventual outcome.

The greatest problem facing the Axis forces was lack of supplies, in particular fuel. Even before they reached North Africa, Allied aircraft and submarines were destroying large amounts of these supplies. These problems also led to increasing friction between the German and the Italian commands, due to the disproportionate way in which material was divided between them.

The massive territorial gains that Rommel's forces had previously made, led to very stretched lines of communication, causing delays in getting material to the front line (the nearest port, Tobruk, was around 350 miles away). This also led to increased exposure to attacks by the Allied Desert Air Force (DAF). The necessity to utilise large amounts of captured transport further exacerbated this problem. The Axis forces were also facing increasing health and fatigue problems, with Rommel himself having to return to Germany for treatment shortly before the battle. All these difficulties crucially delayed the time when the Axis forces could once more go on the offensive.

The Allies had far shorter lines of land communication, though any equipment arriving in Egypt took two to three months to get from the UK or USA, due to the long, but relatively safe journey round the Cape of Good Hope. At this time there were around 100,000 tons of supplies on the way to them, including large numbers of the new Sherman tank. Rommel knew about these supplies and the fact that any attack he made, had to be carried out before they arrived. Another reason for attacking as soon as possible was the constantly improving state of the Allied defences. Those to the north of Bare Ridge had already been made sufficiently strong to persuade Rommel that he had to attack in the south. These southern defences were also being quickly brought up to standard.

There was a problem with morale in the Allied forces. However, in Montgomery the Eighth army had a new commander with new ideas both in terms of tactics and for restoring morale. The use of Ultra (the decryption of messages sent using Enigma) and good reconnaissance meant that Montgomery was well informed of Rommel's intentions. This was a major disparity between the two sides, with the Axis forces carrying out little in the way of intelligence work. In the past, this had not mattered, but here it was another crucial factor as it caused a severe underestimation, by Rommel, of the strength of the Allied defences.

Before going any further it is important to understand the geography of the battlefield, and the surrounding area. The area of the attack was over undulating ground and through a series of shallow depressions situated between, and slightly beyond, Bare Ridge in the north and Hunter's Plateau in the south (see the map at the bottom of the page). As the group saw when we visited the site, these depressions are not deep (at most ten to fifteen feet) they can however hide both tanks and anti-tank guns. Due to the monotonous colouring of the desert, either scrub or sand, it is virtually impossible to see these depressions, along with anything that is in them, until you are actually upon them.

To the South of Hunter's Plateau is the awe-inspiring Qattara Depression. A cliff over sixty feet high forms the Northern edge of the depression that stretches as far as the eye can see. Unlike the desert to the North, the sand is much softer and impassable for armoured vehicles. Along with substantial sand dunes, the depression is also interspersed with large, high, rocky outcrops.

Rommel's plan was for his armoured units to smash their way through the depressions and the forces and minefields protecting them, during the opening night. By morning, they were to be facing north in positions parallel with the Alam El Halfa ridge. At first light, his eastern most armoured units would advance north east, behind the ridge and head for the coast. His forces on the right flank would at the same time, engage the Allied front lines from the rear.

With the Eighth Army cut off from its supply bases, their armoured forces would have to engage those being commanded by Rommel; at which point he hoped that the superior skill of his units in mobile warfare would defeat the Allies. At the same time his infantry units would move forward to overwhelm their Allied counterparts in the northern sector of the lines. The German and Italian forces would then be able to head for Alexandria, Cairo and the Nile Delta.

Just as Rommel realised the importance of trying to engage the Allies in mobile battle, Montgomery realised that a static battle of attrition best suited his men and their quantitatively superior but qualitatively inferior, dug in tanks. Even before the battle he was planning an offensive move, (the Battle of El Alamein 23^rd October – 4^th November) he saw the Axis attack as being the perfect opportunity to wear down the already limited forces that Rommel had.

Montgomery made sure that his defences in and around the vital depressions were as strong as possible. In addition, enough forces were placed on or just behind the Alam El Halfa ridge to ensure that the expected Axis swing to the North could be repulsed.

Montgomery also made it clear that there would be no mad dash counter-attack after the German offensive had been halted. He understood the risks that this would pose and made it clear to all his commanders in the field that previous mistakes would not be repeated. Any counter attack would be carried out slowly and with due caution.

The battle began on the night of the 30^th / 31^st August with diversionary attacks to the north of Ruweisat Ridge and beyond. At 10.00 pm the Axis armoured formations began to move forward, whilst in front of them an artillery barrage focused on the gaps in the minefield that had been used by Allied troops. At around the same time the DAF carried out heavy attacks on the concentrations of Axis transport. This was the first indication that the vital element of surprise had already been lost.

The Allied front line in this sector was arranged as follows: (from north to south): 2^nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade; 2^nd Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps (60^th); a composite regiment of 10^th Hussars including a Rifle Brigade Company; the 4^th Light Armoured Brigade and 1^st Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps (60^th) along with a composite regiment of the 4^th / 8^th Hussars. These units were backed up by the artillery of the 3^rd and 4^th Regiments of the Royal Horse Artillery. Opposing them (again from North to South) were the German 90^th Light Brigade, the Italian XX Corps, the Deutche Afrika Korps (DAK) formed by the 21^st and 15^th Panzer Divisions and a combined German and Italian Reconnaissance Group.

As Axis troops moved forward to clear the mines by hand (a relatively safe procedure due to the lack of anti-personnel mines and booby traps), the Allied front lines opened fire, forcing the Axis troops and armour back. The DAF was also called up to drop both bombs and flares.

At 4.30 am the DAK finally managed to advance, just to the north of Himeimat with around 60 tanks. Soon after, around the Muhafid depression, the 90^th Light Brigade also managed to break through, with around 30 tanks. This movement on both their flanks forced the Allied troops to pull back to the secondary line of minefields to the east. Himeimat itself was lost, but the 4^th / 8^th Hussars were able to stay on the high ground that ran east from there, to continue harrying the enemy. Backing them up further to the east were the tanks of the 3^rd County of London Yeomanry.

By mid morning, things were looking grim for Rommel and his men. The required break out had not happened and along with the forces on the ground, the DAF was causing heavy losses. A mine had wounded Nehring, the DAK commander, and von Bismarck, the 21^st Panzer Division commander, had been killed in an air attack. Rommel now decided to change the focus of his attack. Instead of heading east of Alam El Halfa ridge, his forces were to concentrate on the ridge itself.

Eventually the DAK were able to break through the second set of minefields, where they slowly moved north and north-east, thus forcing Allied withdrawals towards Point 102 at the western end of the Alam El Halfa ridge. At the same time, the reconnaissance forces pushed the Allied forces off the southern escarpments. In the early afternoon a dust storm blew up, this caused problems for the advancing troops and their vehicles, though it also provided cover from the incessant Allied air attacks.

The disposition of the 22^nd Armoured Brigade around Point 102 was as follows: (clockwise from the south east): a mixed regiment of the 5^th Royal Tank Regiment and the 2^nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, the 4^th County of London Yeomanry, an anti tank platoon of B Company 1^st Rifle Brigade and a mixed regiment of the 1^st and 6^th Royal Tanks. In reserve, about two miles to the rear of the position, were the tanks of the Royal Scots Greys. Also in this position were eighteen 25 pounders of the 1^st Royal Horse Artillery.

At around 6.00 pm the German forces were spotted moving to the north east just out of range of the 22^nd Brig, apparently oblivious Allied forces. At this point the British tanks and artillery made their presence known and the Germans turned directly towards the British position. When they made contact, the fighting was brief, but intense. A squadron of the County of London Yeomanry was wiped out, leaving a dangerous gap in the centre of the British position. They had however slowed the German advance, which was halted by the arrival, just in time, of the tanks of the Greys. British artillery then stopped further attacks round the western and eastern flanks of the position.

With the light failing, the German forces pulled back to the Ragil depression. The only action during the night was the bombardment of the Axis forces by both the Allied artillery and air force, with particular attention being paid to the Axis motor transport.

Just after sunrise on the morning of 1^st September, 15^th Panzer Division made a renewed attack on the eastern part of the Alam El Halfa positions. This was beaten off by tanks of the 22^nd Brig, which were helped by the 3^rd Royal Tank Regiment, the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry and the Staffordshire Yeomanry advancing from and engaging the right flank of the Germans. To the west of Point 102 the artillery of 23^rd Division incessantly pounded a possible Axis attack.

Air attacks were carried out throughout the day on the Axis forces including one on the headquarters of the 15^th Panzer Division, which nearly caught Rommel himself. These air attacks carried on through the night causing much damage and casualties to the Axis troops and armour.

There was little action on the 2^nd September. In the south the 4^th / 8^th Hussars attacked a formation of around 300 Axis lorries. Later in the day, the same unit had a further attack beaten off by tanks of the Ariete Division. At this point Montgomery started to plan the Allied counter-attack. As before, heavy Allied air attacks carried on through the night, though there was no fighting on the ground.

In the morning of the 3^rd September, Montgomery made it clear that with the exception of patrols there was to be no forward movement on the ground. The DAF continued their heavy attacks and at around mid-day reported that Axis troops were withdrawing in large numbers. Attempts were then made to engage the Axis forces in the south. These were largely unsuccessful due to strong opposition.

Just after mid-night Operation BERESFORD was launched by the New Zealand Division against the Axis left flank. Problems with the assembly caused several delays before it even started. Further problems followed with little progress being made by 4^th and 5^th Royal West Kents against the Axis defences on the northern edge of the Munassib depression. Further east, better progress was made by the New Zealand 5^th Division, but the attack again floundered due to troops becoming separated to the east and west. The 50^th Royal Tanks also lost twelve tanks, mainly due to mines.

By the morning of the 4^th September, for nearly 1000 casualties, progress of less than two miles over tactically weak ground had been made. Montgomery decided soon after to call off the attack. The Allied armoured forces on the right flank had also been largely ineffectual partly due to large numbers of breakdowns. Throughout the day the Axis forces gradually withdrew, making the occasional counter-attack. During the night heavy and successful air attacks were once again carried out against the Axis forces in the Ragil depression. Whilst these were happening, the New Zealand Forces pulled back to their original positions and the German forces withdrew further.

On the final day of the battle, 5^th September, the Allied troops slowly reoccupied the ground given up by the Axis forces. In the evening, Montgomery acknowledged the end of the battle, and congratulated his men. The German and Italian forces, without the usual harassment by the DAF, withdrew to positions slightly to the east of their original starting positions, holding the area of the first set of Allied minefields and the ground around Himeimat.

After the battle, Rommel wrote that overwhelming air superiority and the ability to expend huge amounts of artillery ammunition gave the Allies a massive advantage, particularly when using area-bombing tactics on the unprotected forces on the ground. He also acknowledged that air superiority gave the Allies good intelligence, allowing them to maximise their use of firepower on the ground and in the air. Rommel also, as ever, cited a constant lack of supplies as being a crucial problem.

Montgomery highlighted the importance of the Eighth army fighting as a combined unit, utilising its firepower to its maximum potential. He felt that careful planning before the battle had allowed the Allied forces to carry on with their own pro-active plan, rather than having to react to the Axis tactics. He also recognised that the overwhelming use of airpower in close conjunction and cooperation with the ground forces was crucial.

The failure of operation BERESFORD showed that there were still problems with cooperation between the Allied armour and infantry. This is reflected in Montgomery's choice of tactics for the battle of El Alamein. One major criticism of Montgomery is that he was over cautious and that he failed to mop up the Axis forces after their abortive offensive. He was of the opinion that the Allies were still not in a position to do so. The DAK had certainly not been wiped out during the first two days of fighting and the Axis forces as a whole were still able to put up a good fight, as the failure of BERESFORD highlighted.

As has been stated, the situation leading up to the battle on both sides dictated the way it was to be fought and the eventual outcome. Without the necessary supplies and petrol, the German and Italian forces were unable to attack, but whilst they were waiting the defences they would have to breach became ever stronger. With hindsight it is easy to say that the only option really open to Rommel, after the failure of the initial attacks on the El Alamein positions in July, was a tactical withdrawal. Whether his own pride or Hitler's would have allowed this to happen is debatable.

Rommel knew that this offensive was a gamble but one he had to make. As it was, the gamble did not pay off, and a few weeks later the Allies were able to go on the attack themselves, thus setting the stage for the eventual ejection of German and Italian forces from North Africa. Whilst the battle of Alam El Halfa was a relatively small affair in terms of numbers of men and tanks involved, it crucially set the scene for one of the most significant battles of the Second World War, namely that of El Alamein. It is for this reason, along with the memory of the 2930 Axis casualties and the 1750 Allied casualties, that this battle should be recognised as being of such importance.