El Alamein Train Station: Logistics

Matthew Crilly, Intranet Developer, IWM

El Alamein

Looking at the logistical problems that the Axis forces faced while based in North Africa. More specifically:

• what was transported,
• how far it was transported,
• how it was transported, and
• logistical problems facing Rommel.

The problems Rommel faced in transporting supplies from Axis controlled ports to the front where he struggled to keep his Afrika Korps fighting.

Firstly, what do we mean by logistics? Logistics has many meanings, but Martin van Creveld has defined it as "the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied". As you shall see, there were many problems Rommel faced keeping his moving army supplied.

Logistics has an image problem. It's not very glamorous, but that doesn't mean it's not important. Most people prefer reading and hearing about the exciting battles and heroic stories. But consider the poor Bavarian lorry driver, driving 1400 miles to deliver his supplies, then turning around to head back to repeat the process. All the while trying to avoid being shot or blown up. It is my belief that the logistical problems contributed to the see-saw effect of the battles fought in North Africa.

The code name for the introduction of German troops to Africa was Sonnenblume, which is German for "Sunflower" - this term has been likened by German historian Wolf Heckman to represent a "huge and showy flower at the end of a long and rather fragile stem" - very similar to the supply lines of the German forces in North Africa as we shall see.

So what were the needs of Rommel's forces in Africa?

The needs of Rommel's forces were no different from any other army in the world. He needed fuel, oil, lubricants, ammunition, soldiers, armoured units, spare parts, and not to forget basics like food and water. The main difference being that for Rommel, these items were not readily available in the desert. Essentially everything the Afrika Korps required to function had to be sent by sea or air from Italy to Tripoli. All very costly - in terms of time and losses. An example of the lack of local resources can be found in something as simple as preparing food for troops. The German field ovens used wood to cook, wood which had to be sent from Italy due to the lack of local wood supplies in the desert. Also, desert wells or desalination plants on the coast supplemented water supplies. Water would be collected from these sources, and stored at distribution points before being transported by truck to the front.

How far were supplies transported?

Think about where the supplies came from prior to landing at Tripoli. Some supplies would have come from as far as German factories down through Italy to the Italian ports. From these Italian ports across the Mediterranean to Libya. The distance from the main port of Tripoli, which is where most of the supplies for Rommel's forces landed, to El Alamein, is approximately 1400 miles (over 2,200 kilometres). Supplies could also be sent to the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi which were closer to the front - but the amounts unloaded at these ports was limited due to damage sustained by RAF bombing. Tobruk could handle 600 tons per day and Benghazi 750, compared to Tripoli which had a capacity of 1,500 tons per day. Also the Italians were reluctant to unload at Tobruk or Benghazi for fear of attack while in harbour.

How were supplies transported?

Repairing a flat tyre

As the region was (and still is) very underdeveloped, trucks were the main means of transportation. According to German Major General Alfred Toppe, "there was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads each about thirty kilometres in length, in Tripolitania (northwest Libya) were of no military importance". So trains for the Germans were useless as a means of transporting supplies to the front. Once supplies had arrived in Tripoli, there was one main road supply route, the Via Balbia. This road followed the coast and was susceptible to flash flooding during winter, as well as being vulnerable to attack from Allied units. In this flat, mostly treeless desert, dust clouds raised by columns of vehicles would stand out from great distances (possibly up to 50 miles on clear days), and as Rommel was unable to guarantee protection to his supply columns along these routes they were open to enemy attack. An alternative to the main road were the many desert tracks - but these caused greater wear and tear on vehicles and also took much longer to deliver their cargoes to the forward positions. Later, aircraft were used in a desperate attempt to transfer supplies, but by this time it was probably too late to provide much benefit.

What logistical problems did Rommel have?

Apart from those already mentioned, the closer Rommel's forces got to Cairo, the longer the Axis supply line, but shorter the overland journey for Allied supply lines.

The Germans were losing the supply war along the African coast as well as at sea. RAF raiders strafed trucks and boats ferrying cargo between German held ports and the Axis lines. Also, the British based in Malta greatly reduced the number of ships, and consequently supplies that reached Africa.

Much has been said about the Italian shipping and the losses they suffered at the hands of the allies, yet despite this, the Italians still succeeded in putting an average 72,000 tons across the Mediterranean in the four months July - October. This was just above Axis current consumption. Rommel's problems weren't primarily about getting supplies across the Mediterranean, but more to do about the length of his lines of communications inside Africa and the difficulties moving these supplies.

The capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, and the distances to be travelled so vast - that for all Rommel's tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble.

Rommel was also using large amounts of his fuel stocks in transporting the remainder of his forces at the front. This combined with losses to enemy attacks, meant the Germans were losing as much as 50 percent of fuel that landed between Tripoli and the front. - think about how much fuel would be used to transport a fully laden truck 1400 miles and back.

Which leads onto the next problem. There was also a dire shortage of transport vehicles. According to Martin van Creveld,

"A motorised force of one division required 350 tons of supplies a day, including water. To transport this quantity over 300 miles of desert, the Army High Command calculated that, apart from the troops' organic vehicles and excluding any reserves, thirty-nine columns each consisting of thirty two-ton trucks would be needed".

This equates to nearly 1200 trucks for one motorised force.

Rommel was never able to obtain enough trucks to support the combat units he had at his disposal. Considering the size of his forces, Rommel would have required approximately 5000 trucks dedicated to supplying his three divisions over a 300 mile line of communication. At one point during the campaign, Rommel requested an additional 8000 trucks for his supply columns. The Army High Command rejected this request as all four German armoured groups in Russia only had 14,000 trucks between them.

Rommel was an aggressive leader and moved his troops forward quickly after any successful attack. This however, would leave him further away from his supply lines and in some instances they could not keep up. For example, after taking Tobruk, the army's advanced units moved so quickly that they outran their supply elements. Some German tanks were empty or so low on fuel, they siphoned fuel from the supply vehicles to get back on the move. This action not only stranded the supply vehicles but delayed their return to get more supplies.

Local factors probably had the biggest critical impact on German logistic efforts. In most other theatres of war, armies are usually able to make use of some local resources. Again to quote van Creveld: "Operating in the desert, neither the British nor their German opponents had the slightest hope of finding anything useful but camel dung".

To finish, a quote from Rommel made during the Axis withdrawal from Egypt:

"The first essential condition for an army to be able to stand the strain of battle is an adequate stock of weapons, petrol and ammunition. In fact, the battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins. The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around".

In the end, it seems that the Axis forces had enough supplies, but in the wrong places. At the front, the Allies were able to rally roughly two to one in all areas: tanks, personnel, anti-tank against the Axis forces. The wharves in Libya were crowded with supplies while at the front Rommel was constrained in his actions by deficiencies, the logistical struggle was crucial in determining the outcome of this battle.