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Suvla

Suvla Bay lies to the north of Anzac Cove. The original GHQ plan was to land the 11th Division south of Nibrunesi Point on the night of 6th August.  They were to land on the beaches designated by the letters 'C' and 'B', and  to surprise and overwhelm any local Turkish troops on Lala Baba immediately north of the beaches. They were to seize the commanding heights all around Suvla Bay namely Karokal Dagh and Kiretch Tepe Sirt to the north, with the Tekke Tepe range, Chocolate Hill and W Hills to the east. 

It was thought by GHQ that Turkish defence works of indeterminate strength on the southern slopes of Chocolate and W Hills could prevent a direct approach to these last objectives, so the assault troops were to skirt the Salt Lake, which lay behind Suvla Bay, and approach them from the apparently unguarded north to secure them before daylight in order to prevent the guns being used against our troops.

After daybreak on the 7th August this covering force was to be strongly reinforced by the 10th Division and the whole force was to assist the Anzac forces, if necessary, in the battle for Sari Bair. Speed was to be of the essence if the plan was to succeed. Every minute wasted after landing would allow the Turks time to move up their reserves and organise a counter stroke. These plans were explained to Lieutenant General Stopford commanding the IX Corps on 22nd July.

His initial reaction was favourable but he soon wavered after discussions with his senior staff officers. Their main objection was that, as howitzers could not be landed till the morning of the 7th August, then the Chocolate and W Hills could not be captured before dawn as envisaged. Furthermore the troops would, in their opinion, be physically unable to get as far as the Tekke Tepe heights by this time. Finally, as they were advised to attack Chocolate Hills from the north could not a landing be made actually inside Suvla Bay to reduce the length of the long march round the Salt Lake?

These were not negligible objections and the futility of frontal attacks without artillery support against defended positions had been driven home at Helles. The irony was that at Suvla there were only three Turkish battalions and their defences were either illusory or, even when well dug in, lacking in barbed wire or machine guns. The GHQ staff failed to recognise this lack of resolve and they co-operated by making amendments to the original plan which freed Stopford from the original commitments to capture the high ground before dawn. The 'primary objective' was now to secure Suvla Bay as a base for the new northern zone. They were only to secure Chocolate and W Hills and henceforth support the Anzac operations if it did not prejudice this priority. The navy was also persuaded against their better judgment to land one brigade of the division inside the Bay on what was to be known as 'A' Beach. The other two brigades were to land as before at 'C' and 'B' Beaches.

The orders issued by Stopford and IX Corps staff show the effects of this overall dilution. Although precise in trivial matters there was no mention of the all-important necessity of speed in securing the hills as soon as possible before the Turkish reinforcements arrived. The 10th Division which was meant to exploit success was not given any task in the orders. This watering down process was continued in the orders issued by 11th Division on 5th August. By now the capture of W Hills was only to be attempted if possible. Things were now so blurred that the divisional commander believed that one of the reasons for the Anzac operations was to distract attention from the Suvla landings. By the time brigade and battalion orders were issued within his division the process of dilution was complete and no-one was left responsible for the original concept of a 'coup de main', the capture of the hills before dawn. The necessity of a clear and common sense of purpose is all important from all participants in any military endeavour. This was already conspicuous by its absence amongst the British command.

The combination of irresolute leadership, sudden death from an unseen enemy and lack of water conspired to paralyse initiative amongst the British battalions as they landed on 7 August despite the minimal nature of the Turkish opposition. As night fell the objectives of the 11th Division had not been attained because they had not been seriously attempted. The three heroic Turkish battalions had been successful in holding Suvla Bay against all the hordes of troops that Hamilton had marshaled against them. At the end of the day the Turks were left in command of all the tactically important high ground and all British had achieved was the capture of some minor outposts.

From this point onwards, the situation became a race as the British sought to land and deploy their troops faster than the Turks could call up their reserve divisions from Bulair. Once actually on the road the expected marching time they would require to get from Bulair to Suvla was approximately thirty hours, which meant they would arrive some time late on 8th August or early on 9th August.

After receiving the reports of his divisional generals and worried by the lack of artillery and stores which had been landed, Stopford decided that no advance could be made until the evening of 8 August at the earliest. When at last the troops moved forward they encountered minimal opposition, but the men were tired and the sheer length of the line they were trying to establish across the plain caused terrible disruption amongst his battalions. Stopford was reminded by an increasingly frantic GHQ as to the importance of grasping a firm foothold on Tekke Tepe as an absolute priority as they would be the first point of contact with the Turkish reserves marching from Bulair, but he remained paralysed by the fear of attacking entrenched positions. Hamilton intervened personally, but it was too late and the Turkish reserves were able to seize control of Tekke Teppe early on 9 August. From there they could look down on the British line as it evolved below them on the plain.

Scimitar Hill now became the focus of a chaotic battle that raged to and fro as both sides gained temporary local superiority. As the day wore on the Turkish shelling increased and the tinder dry scrub on top of Scimitar Hill caught fire under the bursting shells. Gradually the British troops were forced back and the hill was lost at around noon. Attacks along Kiretch Tepe failed and attempts made to link the Suvla area to the newly expanded Anzac area were hotly contested. By nightfall on 9th August almost nothing had been achieved and most of the IX Corps was in serious disarray. Since 6th August the 10th and 11th Divisions had suffered severe casualties and had become hopelessly inter-mingled. The newly landed 53rd Division had been thrown into battle, piecemeal all along the British line. The chaos and confusion of orders and counter orders, lack of maps or briefing and the linked curses of heat, thirst and exhaustion had visibly reduced morale throughout all three divisions. The 9th August marked the end of any real chance of success at Suvla. Further attacks were futile as the pattern of events was fully established. 

On 10 August an assault by 53rd Division on Scimitar Hill was a terrible failure and was eventually abandoned having achieved nothing but a hefty casualty list and another division had been ruined during its first two days of action. As they were attacking the 54th Division was landed at Suvla. It represented the last immediately available reserve and GHQ had intended to deploy it as a complete division for a decisive blow in an effort to capture Tekke Tepe. To prepare the way for this attack it was decided that the 163rd Brigade (including the 5th Battalion, Norfolk Regiment) should push forward on 12 August to the foothills of Tekke Tepe, clearing away pockets of snipers, to establish a secure line from which the main assault could be launched next day. The attempt was another dismal failure and the main attack was perforce cancelled. An attempt on 15 August by 10th Division to attack along Kiretch Tepe made some progress but any gains were lost to strong Turkish counter-attacks next day. 

Stopford and many of the more inadequate divisional and brigade commanders were replaced and on 15th August General Beauvoir de Lisle arrived to take over temporary command of IX Corps. His priority was to organise a strike, as quickly and strongly as possible against the W Hills and Anafarta Spur. These features were still of crucial importance, not by then to support the failed Sari Bair operations, but to help protect the poor British positions scattered across the Suvla Plain from Turkish shell fire. The seriousness of the position was now apparent. At Suvla a frontage of 20,000 yards was being held by only 50,000 troops when really 80,000 were required at the accepted defence ratio of four men per yard. To make matters worse they were facing up to 75,000 Turks who still had reinforcements arriving on a daily basis. Hamilton and de Lisle decided on one last effort. After receiving reinforcements of the veteran 29th Division at Helles and the dismounted yeomanry of the 2nd Mounted Division on 18th August, a final attack was ordered on 21 August. This last gambler's throw of the dice was a dreadful failure and marked the end of the offensive.

Despite all the intensive effort and thousands of casualties the great August offensive had achieved nothing of real importance. The real objective - the capture of Sari Bair - had been denied Hamilton and the IX Corps had succeeded only in establishing itself a base. This was all that General Stopford ever thought possible but, by his pusillanimity, he had ensured that the brief golden opportunities at Suvla were wasted.

Peter Hart (IWM)